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INTRODUCTION
IMAGES OF WAR IN AFRICA
This paper begins with the songs Bob Marley entitled "War." This song articulated the 
longing for an end to colonial rule by Africans all over the world. In another song, "Ride 
natty ride," Marley wailed, "And everywhere the fire is burning, destroying and burning 
their soul. So ride natty ride, go de natty go de.1 And now the people are gathered on 
the beach, the politicians rise to give a speech. The people said, ’sit down and pull your 
own weight’."
This song pointed to the resilience of the working people in the face of violence and 
spiritual degradation. Throughout the African continent and beyond, cultural artists 
and village dialecticians have taken the lead in providing inspiration for the resistance 
to the militarism and violence of external domination. Through songs, dance, and other 
forms of cultural reproduction, these forces have taken the lead in the mobilization for 
reconstruction and spiritual renewal. Angolan singers sing songs calling for 
reconciliation and peace. The issue which is posed is: Do we as African scholars and 
activists, pull our. own weight in the search for peace in Angola?
How do we as scholars at the theoretical level challenge the dominant interpretations 
of war, conflicts and peace by showing how silenced narratives could provide alternative 
conceptualizations for understanding the real effects and consequences of war and peace 
which have been rationalized (in the social sciences literature especially in conflict 
resolution centers) as though certain peoples are naturally suited for war. What is the 
history of warfare and destabilization in Africa? In the period after the Cold War, there 
has arisen a plethora of institutions of conflict management whose mandate is to 
"manage chaos."2
In these institutions, which are to' be found predominantly in Europe and North 
America, managing "chaos" is the new narrative for " managing ethnic conflict" since 
chaos is supposed to be a natural state to Africa and African "tribes" are in constant 
conflict with each other. There are many authorities who have categorized the war in 
Angola as a "civil war" but the concrete experience of warfare and violence is not only 
connected to the different political objectives of the combatants but also to the 
ideological system of colonialism and to the armaments culture of the West. One new 
component of this ideological system is the emphasis on humanitarian and political 
intervention in Africa.
Conflict resolution centers which are at the forefront of the discussion on peace can be 
distinguished from the historical peace research centers in Africa and in Europe which 
have campaigned for peace, even in the period of the cold war. The published works of 
centers such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the 
Africa Peace Research Institute (APRI) and the numerous UNESCO centers for 
disarmament and peace, had established a tradition of "education for peace" when the 
militarists from the countries producing weapons had glorified war and supported 
destabilization and violence in the name of anti-communism. In many instances, 
especially in the former centers of strategic studies, there are now research symposia 
and conferences on peace and justice, but these deliberations are carried out from the
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relative safety of the societies which profit from war. From this safety, scholars can 
develop "Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa." 3 Seldom do these guidelines 
involve the building of democratic and participatory relations so that peace can be 
sustained and contradictions solved through internal deliberations.
The peace-keeping bona fides of many international organizations can now be evaluated 
in the year when Europeans are celebrating 50 years of peace and the defeat of fascism. 
Unfortunately, the triumphant celebrations of victory over fascism do not investigate 
the conditions in Europe which led to the capitalist depression, fascism and war. The 
United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 after the carnage and genocide of the Second 
World War as a peace-keeping institution. It is now an opportune moment for Africans 
to re-examine the peace-keeping operations of the UN from the period of the 
decolonization of the Congo to the most recent peace-keeping forays in Angola, Rwanda 
and Somalia. There is a body of critical scholarship which has exposed the inability of 
the UN to develop clear goals for peace because of the competing interests of the 
permanent members of the Security Council.4 There are many voices raising these 
concerns and the continued fighting in the Balkans has exposed the limits of the thinking 
behind the peace keepers of the Security Council in general. The principal question 
which has not been settled is whether peace can be guaranteed on the basis of trying to 
create territories and governments on the basis of ethnic identification?
In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has developed mechanisms for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution and the Secretariat of the OAU is in 
the process of institutionalising these mechanisms. This decision of the OAU to develop 
its own mechanism represented an important departure from the founding tenet of the 
organization where, a key axiom "non interference in internal affairs" was the most 
important element of African cohesion and cooperation for the leaders.5 This departure 
emerged in the context of growing wars on the continent. Under it, the Secretary General 
of the OAU was empowered to mobilise resources to prevent conflict, but as so far, the 
resources for effective conflict prevention are still being sought from external sources. 
The experience of regional attempts to intervene for peace have not been totally 
successful in Rwanda and Liberia. Regional cooperation in the context of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) to resolve conflicts have been more positive 
as in the cases of Mozambique and Lesotho in 1994. The same cooperation which was 
evident in the activities of the Frontline states in fighting against Apartheid is now being 
harnessed in the context of the Association for Southern African States (ASAS). In 
Southern Africa there is greater cooperation in light of the historic linkages in the 
sub-region.
The experience of the peoples of Southern Africa has been that of wars ever since the 
period of European domination and colonization. European pacification campaigns met 
with military resistance on the part of the African poor. White settler dictatorship 
ensured that all aspects of social relations were governed by relations of force. Force 
was used to alienate land and to remove African peasants from their communities so 
that they could become cheap and bonded labourers. In the period immediately after 
the Second World War, Africans had to resort to arms to gain the elementary demand 
of political independence. These wars could be called "just" in so far as international law 
has justified the rights of oppressed peoples to be free from foreign domination.
The war for liberation in Southern Africa was protracted because the stakes were so 
high for the forces in combat, with the African poor on one side of the battle field and
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White settlers in alliance with international mining monopolies on the other side. Once 
the mineral resources of the region had been designated as strategic for the West, the 
arsenal of the military industrial complex was brought to bear to support very 
conservative settler leaders. A fascist government in Portugal was able to mobilise the 
support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in trying to halt the 
decolonization process in the former Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome. Angola as a mineral rich country was seen 
as a significant prize and the continued warfare in that society had its origins in the 
deformed nature of Portuguese colonial rule. This deformity was compounded by the 
alliance with the South African racists.
The full importance of the role of the apartheid government in this war became clearer 
in the eighties when Angola was engulfed in the general war of destabilization in the 
region of Southern Africa. Many aspects of this destabilization have been documented 
and some authorities have attempted to quantify the cost of the warfare. Angola is a 
country of over 11 million citizens and at the time of writing there are over 3.9 million 
persons displaced by the war. In the short period 1992 to 1994, more that 100,000 persons 
lost their lives. The cost of the destruction has been measured by the UN Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs at over US$20 billion. Yet, as Jacques Depelchin had warned, 
the efforts by peace lobbyists to measure the cost of destabilization had the unintended 
effect of trivializing the effects of war and destruction. The destruction of human life is 
the most profound aspect of the war in Angola.
The question which is posed by Depelchin is how do those who really long for peace but 
reap war conceptualize such destructive experiences when the most accessible modes 
of expression and communication are imposed by the very forces which are directly or 
indirectly responsible for-such a situation? The evidence of continuous warfare in 
Angola forces progressive scholars to reconsider the dominant concepts of 
peace-keeping and peace-making when there are vested interests inside and outside of 
Angola who profit from continuous warfare. From the period of the Alvor agreement 
in 1975 to the Lusaka Accords of 1994, there have been efforts to lay the ground rules 
for peace in Angola. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Cuban 
forces, peace remained elusive because of the heavy investment in warfare. Angola was 
one of the few countries in Africa with the resources to finance the purchase of 
conventional weapons.
The peace accord signed by the government of Angola with South Africa and Cuba in 
1988 brought the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola in 1989. This accord 
laid the basis for the implementation of UN Resolution 435, the withdrawal of South 
African forces from Angola and Namibia, leading to the independence of Namibia. This 
accord did not .end the involvement of South Africa in the Angolan war. There were 
intensified battles between 1989 and 1991 when the Bicesse Accords were signed to 
bring peace to Angola. This agreement was conceptualized in the simple terms of a 
ceasefire, the confinement of troops to assembly areas, demobilization of the Popular 
Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola ( FAPLA) the army of the MPLA, and the 
Armed Forces For the Liberation of Angola ( FALA), the army of UNITA, and the 
creation of a new army, The Angolan Armed forces ( FAA), the collection and disposal 
of weapons and the organization of elections in 1992.6
The monitoring system for the peace accords comprised of soldiers from the Joint 
Political-Military Commission. This was a Commission of primarily military men who
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had a history of solving political questions by violence. Angolans who were not involved 
in war were not incorporated in the main monitoring of the peace process. Similarly, 
non-military parties and institutions were not involved on the Joint Verification and 
Monitoring Commission (CMVF) which was responsible for the implementation and 
functioning of the mechanisms instituted to verify and exercise control over the 
ceasefire. Even though both the armies of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
claimed to have women in their ranks, there were no women supervising the ceasefire, 
nor ensuring the effective observance of the cease fire. Though the UN Special 
Representative overseeing the peace process was a woman, her stewardship was more 
in the Thatcherite tradition than in that of a feminist who wanted peace. The agenda 
for the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 maintained the same militarist approach to the question 
of peace. The flaws of the past attempts at peace have been highlighted by many 
authorities who have blamed the UN for "making peace on the cheap." No less a person 
than Margaret Anstee, the Special Representative of the Secretary General during the 
period of the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, has criticised the foundations of 
the 1992 peace-keeping mission in Angola.7 Moral arguments on the causes of the "civil 
war" and the violations on the laws of war since 1992 obscure the fact that warfare is a 
specific form of physical coercion. Mary Kaldor in her analysis of "warfare and 
capitalism" has provided an insight into the kind of social relations which generate wars 
of the kind which gutted the Angolan society. "Under capitalism, warfare has become 
an aspect of state activity. This is even more true of civil wars where the insurgent forces 
are generally organized as a form of proto state. Any attempt to analyze the role of 
warfare has to deal with the role of the state."8
The stress on the role of the state brings to the fore the social relations and class forces 
inside and outside Angola with a vested interest in either war or peace. It was Von 
Clausewitz who characterized war as "the continuation of politics by other means." In 
Angola this interconnection between war and politics has been most explicit especially 
in the context of the alliance between UNITA and South Africa. The lessons of the 
previous efforts at peace-making require a theoretical approach to the issues of war and 
peace which elevates the discussion beyond the technical issues of the UN 
peace-keeping mandate in Angola. There is also the requirement of clarifying the role 
of ethnicity and ethnic identification in the politics of war. The destruction of the 
Ovimbundu heartland of Cuito and Huambo by UNITA should have exposed the myth 
that the war in Angola was predicated on ethnic loyalties but the dominant narrative on 
"tribal wars" in Africa ensures that in some centers the war in Angola is characterised 
as ethnic violence. The corollary of this is that peace will be based on ethnic balancing . 
and power sharing.
Amilcar Cabral had warned in Guinea that although ethnicity constituted an important 
factor for the people, divisions of class, religion and gender are also important. In 
Angola, though there has been a lot written on the ethnic nature of the social forces, less 
has been recorded in relation to race and class. Far less has been recorded in relation 
to gender. So far the gendered nature of warfare and violence has in the main eluded 
scholars and commentators on the war. This is a crucial area of investigation since this 
kind of analysis shifts the discussion to the social relations of power between men and 
women at all levels of social reproduction. A gendered analysis of war and peace would 
explore the construction of social relations at all levels: the homestead, the village 
community, the school, institutions of spiritual reflection, the government, the armed
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forces and in economic relations. Such an analysis would focus On how men are 
socialised to be warriors and are portrayed as valiant while women are portrayed as weak 
and vulnerable. In war, the development of arms and weaponry and their use has been 
central to the modern concept of the male experience. 9
Angolan men and women have suffered from war and the politicization of ethnicity. 
However, Angolan african women have suffered the full effects of the war and the 
dislocations in the countryside. They were the most ardent supporters of the peace 
process and the electoral process in 1992.10 Warfare and violence at the level of the 
state has contributed to the general climate where social issues are dealt with in a violent 
manner. Hence, at the domestic level violence has been evident. This gave rise to a 
special non-governmental organization in Luanda defending the rights of battered 
women. For this paper therefore, the gendered nature of war becomes a far more 
important issue than ethnicity.
Because the question of the relationship between gender and politics has been 
underdeveloped in the context of nationalist politics, the discussion on gender is raising 
new elements in African politics. This process of developing a new political culture is 
slow growing out of the ashes of colonial forms and the inheritance bequeathed to the 
African politicians. The issues of war and peace in Angola are linked to the decisive 
issue of the mode of politics. Will the process depart from the commandism and force 
of the colonial inheritance or would more democratic forms of governance be 
developed? Would the political process depart from the mode of vanguardism to neo 
liberalism? It is the contention of this paper that the question of peace in Angola is tied 
to the decisive issue of the development of emancipatory politics, which requires the 
reorganization of the popular participation and expression. In the short run, this 
reorganization is being predicated on the restructuring of the forms of economic 
intervention for economic liberalization and multi partyism. The long term alternative 
is for the redistribution of the wealth of the society to meet the needs of the vast majority 
of the producers whose lives have been negatively affected by war. This alternative is 
one component of the ideological war of the choices in Africa.
War speeds up the processes of transformation and/or regression. In the past 20 years 
warfare and violence were registered as negative forms of coercion in a former colonial 
society. The evidence of the political war along with the economic changes since Angola 
joined the IMF has been for the government to implement an economic and social 
programme which aims at opening up the economy to "market forces." This economic 
programme is similar in content to the program presented by UNITA in its election 
manifesto in 1992. The party form of vanguardism of the MPLA had given way to the 
acceptance of the same principles of economic liberalization as the World Bank. For 
the World Bank, the principal issues in the society relate to trade, price and wage reform. 
The 1992 elections were the opening rounds of the battle to develop a parliamentary 
mode of politics which is based on elite forms of political intervention.11
The IMF and the World Bank have been supporting privatization of nationalised sectors 
of the economy as the answer to inefficiency and loss-making enterprises, but this 
economic path has been problematic since Africans in Angola did not have the economic 
resources to give meaning to the pressure to privatise the economy. Those who initiated 
the economic reforms in Angola were faced with the reality that the social forces with 
the requisite capital to fully benefit from a policy of privatization were the uprooted 
elements of settler colonialism who had retreated to South Africa and Portugal after
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independence. In the absence of an African capitalist class, most of the property in 
Angola had been nationalized in 1975. The Marxist history of the MPLA and its links 
to countries such as Cuba continue to be one of the issues in the see-saw between war 
and peace.
This question of the content of peace and reconstruction is a problem not only for Angola 
but also for the region of Southern Africa. In this sense the history of colonialism and 
apartheid confronts the producers who had been brutally exploited and discriminated 
against while the wealth of their societies was plundered. Africans who produce the 
wealth in Southern Africa want this wealth to be used to provide for the basic 
requirements of social reproduction, food, clothing, shelter, relevant education and 
affordable health care. The elementary social gains for health education and housing 
which had been conceded in the decolonization process are now being eroded under 
the impact of structural adjustment programmes.
The reversal of these gains in societies such as Mozambique has led to the view that the 
struggle in Southern Africa is simultaneously a struggle against colonialism and 
recolonization. It has become clear in Angola that the issue of peace is tied to the 
resolution of the question of which elements will be in the central administration of the 
bureaucracy when the capital-intensive war of the past 20 years comes to an end. The 
articulation of the issue of peace then becomes a class and racial issue and in this sense 
it is imperative that African scholars develop a clear understanding of the real content 
of peace.
During the period of the Cold War, the USSR supported an International Peace Council 
in its ideological war with the USA. The United States, which has emerged as the 
foremost arms exporter, now supports numerous institutions to promote peace. Some 
of these institutions have genuine peace workers but there are scholars in the military 
establishment who view peace-making as an aspect of low-intensity warfare. It is the 
interconnection between low-intensity warfare and peace-making which has made many 
Third World countries cautious with respect to the peace-keeping credentials of the 
USA in the UN. Yet, given the present construction of international politics, it is to the 
agencies of the United Nations dedicated to peace that one seeks to get a coherent 
understanding of intervention for peace. Progressive Africans may criticize the agencies 
of the United Nations but the nature of the critique has to be distinguished from that of 
conservative forces in North America.
There has been considerable debate and discussion within the UN agencies 'as to the 
real content of peace. One author defined peace as follows:
By peace we mean the absence of violence in any given society, both internal and external, direct 
and indirect. We further mean the non-violent results of the equality of rights, by which every 
member of the society, through non-violent means, participates equally in decisional power which 
regulates it, and the distribution of resources which sustain it.13
Nearly every year since the United Nations designated 1986 as The International Year 
of Peace, UNESCO has been mounting conferences to refine the concept of peace. 
UNESCO took the lead from the General Assembly of the UN, declaring that "every 
nation and every human being, regardless of race, conscience, language or sex has the 
inherent right to life in peace."
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In 1982 UNESCO adopted this posture with respect to peace:
There can be no genuine peace when the most elementary human rights are violated or while 
situations of injustice continue to exist, conversely, human rights for all cannot take root and 
achieve full growth while latent or open conflicts are rife...
Peace is incompatible with malnutrition, extreme poverty and the refusal of the rights of self 
determination. Disregard for the rights of individuals, the persistence of inequitable international 
economic structures, interference in the internal affairs of other states, foreign occupation and 
apartheid are always real or potential sources of armed conflict and international crisis. The only 
lasting peace is a just peace based on respect for human rights. Furthermore, a just peace calls for 
the establishment of an equitable international order which will preserve future generations from 
the scourge of war.
This concept of peace is most relevant to this analysis since this concept is not only 
concerned with the silencing of weapons and ceasefire. It also implies that Africans 
cannot speak of peace without fundamental changes in the international system with 
respect to disarmament and demilitarization.14 Though the contribution of this 
analytical framework is significant, there is not enough work done on the relationship 
between the history of the society and the social forces who seek peace. This process is 
what Depelchin terms "conceptualizing and contextualizing the dialectical relationship 
between war and peace." He argued that "societies which have gone through the 
devastation of wars cultivate different histories. These histories are nurtured by 
memories and silences."15 One of the most deafening silences in Angola is that of the 
origins of the struggle for self-determination and the alliances of the parties. Though 
this struggle is embedded in the memory of the people, the thrust of external forces is 
to erase this memory.
It is the contention of this paper that the war and negotiations over peace are actual 
mirrors of a larger war and negotiating process, In the short run, the political weakness 
of the governing elements in Angola will dictate that the content of the negotiations will 
benefit the very same forces who profited from the war. This can be gleaned from the 
appeals of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations. The three 
main elements of this appeal consist of (i) work with respect to relief, resettlement and 
repatriation activities, (ii) activities to clear the more than ten million landmines in the 
country-side and, (iii) support for the demobilization of former combatants and their 
reintegration into civilian life. The principal agencies and organizations which are 
targeted as social agents are the very same organizations which prompted Joseph Hanlon 
to raise the question of Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?
This paper begins with an analysis of the writings on the war and highlights the essence 
of disinformation in much of this writing. Some of it could be called propaganda 
supporting combatants in the war. The importance of this "intellectual propaganda" is 
that it forms an important part of the historical record on war in Angola. The 
underdevelopment of the intellectual culture of Portuguese colonialism and its legacies 
meant that there is considerable literature in English. The underdevelopment is also 
related to the social structure of the society and the weakness of the middle strata. This 
contribution seeks to develop the theoretical tools of Amilcar Cabral with respect to 
the social structure. The insights of Wamba Dia Wamba are also brought to bear to seek 
a better understanding of the war than the conflict resolution theories.
The Angolan war witnessed a conjunction of action by a broad spectrum of forces inside 
and outside the continent of Africa. The wars in Angola had a decisive impact on the
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whole of Southern Africa and this has already been examined in the context of the 
importance of the victory of the Angolans over the South African armed forces at Cuito 
Cuanavale.16 This analysis of the social structure underlines the weakness of an African 
capitalist class and the stakes which are involved in the war.
Despite the absence of a local accumulating class, the wealth of Angola dictated the 
prolongation of a capital intensive war which was fuelled by the mineral resources of 
Angola. An examination of the interconnections between extraction of wealth and war 
can be seen from the fact that the petroleum sector was relatively unaffected by the war 
despite the seizure of Soyo by UNITA in 1993. The seizure of Soyo and the occupation 
of towns and cities by UNITA exposed the fact that the war was a conventional one. This 
fact also underlined the contradictions between the rhetoric of African fundamentalism 
of UNITA and their dependence on external sources of military capital. For a brief 
period, though the MPLA was also plagued by this dependence, the fact that a small 
socialist state such as Cuba had mobilized the non-aligned and progressive forces to 
defend Angola against apartheid had neutralized the corrosive effects of the 
dependence on foreign military advisors.
The fact that the MPLA had to resort to the use of the same elements like lobbyists and 
South African military consultants such as Executive Outcomes that historically had 
supported UNITA demonstrated the weaknesses of the MPLA and the intense effort 
to make this party another comprador instrument for the recolonization of Africa.
PROPAGANDA AND WARFARE
John Mackenie in his Book. Propaganda and Empire: the Manipulation of British Public 
Opinion 1880 -I960 outlined how the various vehicles for imperial propaganda, the 
theatre, the cinema, radio, literature and school textbooks, were mobilised to support 
the military and economic policies of the British ruling class in the hey-day of 
colonialism. The-importance of this study lay in the fact that though overt British 
colonialism is no more a reality (except for a few islands in the Caribbean and in Ireland), 
the alliance of the Anglo-American media along with the accompanying intellectual 
infrastructure dictates that the ideological cluster which influenced this propaganda 
onslaught is still at work, especially with respect to Africa and Africans. The advent of 
television and films expanded the cultural processes for manipulating public opinion. 
Mackenzie linked the relationship between advertising and other marketing techniques 
in the effort to make imperial propaganda profitable.
During World War II the propaganda of the British was simultaneously anti-fascist and 
anti- communist. An effective presentation of the success of the individual and the role 
of the market was refined along with those ideas of Social Darwinism which justified the 
domination of colonial societies by European countries. For a brief period, the crude 
civilizing mission of the imperial enterprise was replaced by the modernising role of 
Europe and America. Mackenzie outlined how much of the intellectual activity, 
especially with respect to justifying imperialism in school textbooks was overtly 
propagandist. He defined propaganda as "the transmission of ideas and values from one 
person, or group of persons, with the specific intention of influencing the recipients’ 
attitudes in such a way that the interests of its authors will be enhanced." 17 Western 
propaganda has been at work at all phases of the decolonization process in Africa.
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By the end of the Cold War, the development of psychological warfare and 
disinformation had become so entrenched that the citizens of the advanced capitalist 
countries came to believe their own propaganda with respect to the realities of the anti­
colonial struggle. The creation of a terrorism industry in the Cold War was linked to 
the security industry and African Freedom fighters were routinely called terrorists.1 
Every African liberation organization from the FLN in Algeria to the ANC in South 
Africa suffered from this disinformation campaign. The fact that the Angolan war of 
liberation was catapulted into the centre of the Cold War divide meant that the arsenal 
of this disinformation and propaganda was brought to bear in Angola. Hence, during 
the period of the Angolan independence struggle, the MPLA were pawns of the Soviet 
Union and their "surrogate" Cuba and SWAPO of Namibia was a terrorist organization. 
Jonas Savimbi was a freedom fighter feted at the White House and the South Africans 
were fighting "communist subversion in Africa."
This conclusion is reinforced by the extensive bibliography on Angola: the Struggle for 
Power. The Political. Social and economic Context 1980 -1993. compiled bv the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAHA) in Johannesburg, South Africa. As 
an intellectual organ of the South African state, the SAIIA had always presented itself 
as a liberal force, but this organization was at all times Eurocentric and anti- communist. 
The authors like most supremacists could not present the facts of the defeat of the S ADF 
in Angola. The authors of this bibliography started with the date of 1980 since this was 
the beginning of the massive destabilization which was given a positive gloss and called 
"constructive engagement."- It was the period of linkage imposed by the Reagan 
Administration in the United States.
This collection. of over 600 pages exposed the interests of the apartheid military 
establishment in the justification for their extended war in Angola, 1975-1994. 
Presented in a neutral academic manner, this extensive bibliography is a very 
sophisticated presentation of the themes of the South Africans that they were supporting 
freedom fighters who were opposed to communist incursion in Southern Africa. This 
bibliography follows a stream of publications published by a so-called Ashanti 
Publishers on the war in Angola. Two of the main authors publishing under this 
publishing house are well known hagiographers, one being none other than Bridgland 
who had written the celebratory book, Jon as S avimbi: A Key to Afr i ca. This same author 
presented a book under Ashanti publishers The War for Africa which argued that South 
Africa withdrew from Cuito Cuanavale in order to support the diplomatic initiatives of 
Chester Crocker. This theme of the strategic retreat of the South Africans at Cuito 
Cuanavale was also the thrust of the book by Helmoed - Romer Heitman, War in 
Angola: The Final South African Stage. Ashanti Publishers, Gibraltar, 1990.19 None of 
these books from the South African sources brought out the fact that there were young 
White conscripts who were suffering from post-stress traumatic disorder (pstd).
This body of literature is part of a new genre of intellectual work which seeks to 
delegitimise the liberation struggles in Africa. Geo-politics, systems analysis, ethnic 
rivalry and anti-communism which is founded on the conceptual poverty of the West 
when confronted with the politics of self-determination hindered the authors of this 
bibliography from grasping the dynamism behind the decolonization of Namibia. It was 
this same dynamism which prevented the military claims of the SADF from gaining 
support from the African majority in South Africa. There is very little literature on the 
Angolan process which saw the activities of the Angolan government as legitimate. In 
the most recent battles, the activities of the government have sought to transform the
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history of national liberation. The link between the Angolan government and the South 
African company Executive Outcomes was the clearest expression of this regression. 
Executive Outcomes is a private consultancy firm with soldiers for hire. This private 
army is comprised of the former special forces of the South African Defence Forces 
(SADF).
Though there have been attempts by Africans such as Amilcar Cabral to develop a theory 
of liberation, the dominant literature has been from those sources which distorted the 
basis of the struggle. This is evident from the influential two volume study on Angola by 
John Marcum. Marcum’s central thesis is that the actions of the three parties (the FLNA, 
MPLA and UNITA), the political differences between them, their politico-diplomatic 
ties etc, were a result of strong ethnic consciousness. This analysis fed into the 
dominant ethnic themes of the military Journals of Paratus (the SADFjournal) and 
themes of the organic intellectuals of the South African state apparatus.2
The Angolan government could not mobilise the kind of resources which were available 
to the South Africans in their anti- communist crusade. The government radio was not 
as effective as that of UNITA since the facility of the political leadership in the area of 
African languages was limited. The President could only speak in Portuguese and the 
television audience was restricted to the urban Portuguese-speaking population with 
electricity. The written sources on the Angolan war which presented the views of the 
government are in the main in Portuguese and limited to sympathizers of the MPLA. 
The three main sources with a perspective critical of South African and Western 
propaganda on the war are, Basil Davidson. In the Eye of the Storm. Anchor Books, 
1973; William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola 
and Mozambique. Zed Books, London, 1994; Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, 
Angola in the Frontline. Zed Books, London 1983; and Keith Sommervile, Angola, 
Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter Publishers, London. One of the main 
weaknesses of this body of literature is the inability to critically analyze the limitations 
of the state Marxism of the MPLA, hence there is no clear understanding of the dramatic 
shift in the economic policies of the MPLA since 1991.
SOURCES WITH SYMPATHIES FOR UNITA
An examination of the literature on the war with overt support for UNITA revealed 
clearly the linkages between warfare and propaganda. In the 1980s Bridgland wrote of 
the exploits of UNITA centralising the "charisma" of Jonas Savimbi and suggested that 
this leader was a key to Africa. The fact that the print media was not so well established 
in Africa led to the sharpening of the tools of the radio and television for the propaganda 
war in Angola. The radio station ,"Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel," 
beamed across Central and Southern Africa , continuing, in the words of one 
commentator, "to pour out disinformation and to stir ethnic hatred, poisoning the 
country’s future."21 This radio station, though crude and manipulative of ethnic identity, 
was supported by the USA, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. The 
International Freedom Foundation which launched the Democratic International at 
Jamba in 1988 mobilised support from conservative forces to provide resources for a 
coordinated propaganda effort. This same organization orchestrated a Hollywood film,. 
Red Scorpion, celebrating the hagiographic details presented in the book by Bridgland. 
Those in the media who were closely connected to UNITA dubbed Jonas Savimbi,
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"Reagan’s African Rambo."
The importance of this cluster of books, film and radio lay in the way in which these 
ideas were supported by policy-makers in the United States. The evidence of the 
relationships between war, disinformation and propaganda is most evident in the 
scholarship of the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester 
Crocker. Throughout his career as the chief policy maker for Africa in the Reagan 
administration (1981-1988), Dr. Crocker had access to the resources of US information 
technology and agencies to promote the interests of destabilization (disguised as 
constructive engagement). Since his retreat to academia he has published his version 
of the confrontation in Southern Africa. The very title of the book, High Noon in 
Southern Africa: Keeping Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood, distorted the historical 
evidence of the destabilization and destruction in Southern Africa. The author of the 
book, who was himself the originator of the theory of "constructive engagement," 
claimed credit for peace, when it was the very concept of linkage which orchestrated the 
repeal of the Clark amendment and provided military and financial support for UNITA 
and South Africa in order to remove "the communists" from power in Angola.
The anti-communist theme which is the main thrust of this propaganda is repeated in a 
number of important books. Four of the most strident are listed in this discussion on 
propaganda and warfare: (a) Leon Dash Jr., Savimbi’s 1977 Campaign Against the 
Cubans and the MPLA: Munger Africana Notes, City 1977; (b) W. Martin James, A 
Political History of the Civil War in Angola. Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1992; 
(c) Daniel Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention. Mcfarland Books, City 1993; 
and (d) A. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: a Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World. 
Westview Press, Boulder, Col, 1980. These books written for audiences outside of Africa 
justified the military support which went to UNITA from the Republican establishment 
in the USA.
Elaine Windrich in her book The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi. the US Media 
and the Angolan War, Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, provided an antidote to the 
crude anticommunism of the propaganda organized by the International Freedom 
Foundation. The importance of the book lay in the massive documentation which 
brought out forces in the US media which ensured that there was positive information 
on UNITA so that there would be "effective and appropriate support from the US 
Congress for the war." The chapter on "War Propaganda: Hot and Cold" brought out 
the extensive cover-up of the role of the South African defence forces in the destruction 
of the infrastructure in the country. Instead, the economic crisis in the country was 
blamed on the communist policies of the MPLA. It was this same hot and cold 
propaganda which presented media and television positions on the magnanimity of 
UNITA in winning the peace, in the signing of the Bicesse Accords. European television 
stations carried special reports on the bravery of UNITA after the visit of Jonas Savimbi 
to the European Parliament in 1991. Reality soon intervened and the real democratic 
and peace-making credentials of UNITA were revealed after the 1992 elections.
There are a few books which have been critical of the US policies in Angola. One of the 
more outstanding has been that by John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. 
Norton, City 1978. The importance of this book lay in the fact that the author was the 
head of the CIA task force for Angola when Kissinger wanted to halt the coming to 
power of the MPLA in 1975. In many respects, the book, Angola: the Politics of 
Intervention reads as an attempt to discredit the information in Stockwell’s book.
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The imperatives of the war has produced critical commentaries on the levels of 
destruction in Angola. Much of this writing on the number of amputees or the amount 
of displaced persons comes from international NGO sources. This is evident from the 
most recent publication by Human Rights Watch on Angola: Arms Trade and Violations 
of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections. The major limitation of this book is that it 
seeks to lay the blame for the outbreak of the war in 1992 on both sides. In many ways, 
this book could be seen as far more sophisticated propaganda than the work of 
Crocker Presenting an in depth account of the military organization, structure and 
operations of the government’s army and that of UNITA, this monograph traces the 
methods of arms procurement and how UNITA was able to obtain weapons despite the 
sanctions of the United Nations. There is a clear analysis of the impact of city seiges and 
the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas "by both sides." This line of 
reasoning followed the position of the United Nations in its publication of The United 
Nations and the Situation in Angola. May 1991-June 1994. In this monograph the UN 
failed to take responsibility for the breakdown of the peace process and the bloodletting 
of November 1, 1992 which precipitated the most recent stage of the war. One writer 
has argued that "Indeed, dozens of articles, television and radio documentaries, in many 
languages often made after clandestine visits to Huambo from Zaire and South Africa 
have served to alter the image of the events of that weekend in Luanda and Lubango 
out of all recognition."23
BOOKS ON PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
There have been two full length books on the peace process in Angola. One prepared 
by the Cuban government. The Peace Process of Cuito Cuanavale. presented the Cuban 
version of the negotiating process before and after the defeat of the South Africans in 
Angola.24 The intellectual content of the other book was driven by the consultancy 
syndrome of some non- governmental actors in Southern Africa. In this context see 
Sustainable Peace Angola’s Recovery, compiled by David Sogge, Southern African 
Research and Documentation Centre, Harare, 1992. The main critique of this kind of 
writing was its ahistorical approach with respect to the social forces involved in the war 
and consequently the social forces most interested in peace. The remarkable aspect of 
the key incidents of the Angolan war is how the massive information campaign organized 
by the West to support UNITA has been able to maintain support mechanisms for 
warfare in order to support the destabilization of Angola. This destabilization was 
founded not only on military intervention, since the broad spectrum of appeals for aid 
played a part in presenting the Angolan peoples as helpless victims crippled by war. 
Elaine Windrich in her study also pointed out how famine was used as propaganda in 
warfare. There have been many instances in the war where in collaboration with US 
agencies, UNITA was able to get international recognition for the right to receive and 
distribute famine relief through its own military and administrative structures.25
There is now a growing body of literature in Africa which is pointing out that 
"humanitarian intervention" is a form of coercive diplomacy to undermine the 
sovereignty of 'African societies. Many African scholars have pointed out that 
humanitarian interventions are seldom the last resorts they claim to be. "Intervening 
parties, in fact, have often been complicity in creating the humanitarian emergencies 
which intervention is now supposedly to remedy."26 This conclusion made in the case of
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Somalia,, becomes pertinent in the context of Angola in the face of the massive
humanitarian appeals made by the UN to "assist in relief assistance and the promotion
of human welfare." On the one hand, the IMF and the World Bank discourage the
expenditure of the government on education, health and social needs while the
Humanitarian Assistance Unit of the Department of Humanitarian affairs coordinates
r 27the provision of these services with international agencies and NGOs.
The presentation of the people of Angola as helpless "victims" in a never ending "civil 
war" is part of a narrative which devalues the historical resistance of the Angolan peoples 
from the period of Queen Nzinga to the battles at Cuito Cuanavale. Cuito Cuanavale 
was a turning point in the history of Southern Africa and in the next section we analyze 
the social forces of Angola in relationship to war.
Cabral in his study of the social structure of colonial Guinea had underscored the classes 
which had a vested interest in national liberation. National liberation was a special kind 
of war in the sense that the political objectives of the national liberation project were 
very clear: the recovery of political independence. Amilcar Cabral, in the book 
Revolution in Guinea, had outlined class forces in the society in order to develop a clear 
military strategy for the PAIGC. This strategy was meant to clarify those elements which 
supported liberation and those forces which collaborated with Portuguese colonialism. 
This analysis of the social structure becomes important in pointing out how the initiative 
for war shifted from the imperatives of decolonization to the consolidation of class forces 
inside and outside of Angola.
In that analysis, Cabral presented the working poor as the principal force in the search 
for emancipation. In the specific case of Angola, there is a paucity of literature on the 
class composition of the society. The ethnographic studies of the Portuguese tended to 
gloss over embryonic class differences in the rural areas. W. G. Clarence-Smith in his 
study of the society outlined how "racial and ethnic antagonisms sprang largely from the 
economic insecurity of petty bourgeois elements in the colonial society, who were 
constantly threatened with proletarianization and struggling to break out of the vicious 
circle of debt. Racial and ethnic factors were used bv sectors of the petty bourgeois to 
increase their own security at the expense of others."
Though the analysis of Clarence-Smith was based on the period prior to 1945, the 
importance of this historical evidence is to place in a context the vacillation of the middle 
strata of Angolan society. The fact is that one has to penetrate the social structure to be 
able to understand how Angolans could have put other Angolans through the kind of 
suffering which was witnessed in the bombing and shelling of cities. The literature on 
the war was an expression of the external allies of local forces. Documentation on the 
attitude of the workers and peasants to the war has to be found in songs, dance and oral 
rendition of the various battles.
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WAR.
Wamba Dia Wamba in a very little known essay, "Some Aspects of the Historical 
Background to National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: The Case of Angola," 
drew attention to the underdevelopment of Portugal and how this retardation of the 
colonisers affected the political autonomy of the Angolan working class. In this essay, 
Wamba pointed out how ideological and political intolerance by certain class forces had
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led to political repression and hindered creative political thinking.
It took a long time and struggle for the assimilated Angolans’ anti-colonial movement to link up 
with the large mass resistance movement of the Angolan masses of people. The centrality of the 
military aspect in the liberation struggle has had a considerable impact on the commandist 
character of the political leadership and the difficulty of developing a politically autonomous civil 
society. This tendency partially explains the temptation of a military solution to the national 
question in Angola.
Wamba started out from an explicit position of supporting the liberation project, but 
did not limit the articulation of this project to the ideas of those with power. He 
underlined the historical conditions of forced labour and the coercive relations of 
colonialism which served to mobilise the working poor against colonial rule. In this 
analysis, he developed a chart of the differing class interests'29
In all wars there are combatants and competing ideas. The principal ideas in the war in 
Angola are those of domination and African liberation. The ideas of domination 
presented by the scholars pulling their weight for colonial and neo-colonial domination 
have sought to blur the search for emancipation by using the ethnic narrative. At the 
level of intellectual production, the ideas for liberation retreated into the memory of 
the workers and peasants. In the words of Cabral, like seeds waiting for the right 
conditions for germination. The conditions for germination have suffered a tremendous 
setback with the dispersal and disorganization of the communities in Angola: This has 
been most evident in the countryside. In 1995, the population of Angola was estimated 
over 11.2 million. The study of Clarence-Smith on the peasantry in the pre-WW II 
period pointed to the high level of differentiation among the peasantry, ranging from 
the pastoralists in the South to the coffee producers in the Northern areas. The relative 
under-populated nature of this country is a striking factor.
Social differentiation among the peasantry had been rapid since WWII. The chiefs who 
were allied to colonial rule were the first to get access to the limited colonial education 
provided by missionaries. The leadership of both FLNA and UNITA arose out of the 
rising class of rich African farmers in the rural areas. Warfare had led to a systematic 
displacement of the peasantry since the Portuguese attempted to establish protected 
villages and this displacement was compounded by South African occupation and the 
10 million mines planted in the rural areas. The trauma caused by landmines increased 
the dispersal of the poor peasants from the rural areas. Landmines made no distinction 
between combatants and ordinary citizens. Even though the military benefits of the 
landmines were negligible, their destructive effects on the peasantry will last for a long 
period after the war.
The peasantry have been uprooted as a result of 30 years of war: (a) the villagization 
project of the Portuguese, (b) peasants fleeing the areas of South African occupation, 
and (c) the peasantry fleeing the massive firepower of a two capital- intensive armies in 
a poor country. This dispersal has created a very large population of d’eclasse’ elements 
in Angolan society. The other distinction in the peasantry has to do with the gender 
relations in the rural areas. War shifted the burden of social reproduction on to the 
shoulders of the women. On the one hand the traditional women’s role of nurturing and 
protecting was not only sustained but extended by the conditions of war. During the 
period of national liberation, the peasant women formed the backbone of the resistance. 
Through songs, dance, music and the retention of spiritual values they maintained the 
spirit of independence under colonial rule. During the period of colonial rule the
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divisions among the peasantry were not so pronounced, but these divisions were 
manipulated by the competing political parties in the immediate period before 
independence. This competition created room for future exploitation of the subjective 
element of African consciousness among the African people. This became clear in the 
propaganda of African fundamentalism which was beamed by the Voice of the Black 
Cockerel.
The repression of the rural political economy can be measured by the present continuous 
appeals for food for those in the rural areas. In the villages, the peasants suffered 
regardless of which side they supported. Class differentiation in the rural areas and the 
simplistic definition of the peasantry presented by the MPLA during the period of the 
class analysis "created a social base for the opposition to the government". 
Impoverishment of the peasantry led at best to apathy and at worst overt hostility to the 
government in Luanda.
The declared Maoist strategy of UNITA to control the countryside meant that the bulk 
of the war was fought in the rural areas and that women in the rural areas felt the full 
force of the war from both sides. The breakdown of the peasant sector created food 
shortages and dumped millions of poor peasants in the urban "musseques". The poor 
Angolan peasants had no immunity to violence and they will continue to suffer the 
consequences of the mining of the country-side, long after the politicians decide on the 
future forms of political competition.
If peasants suffered, peasant women suffered even more. They were highly vulnerable 
to violence, whether military, social or domestic and in the case of UNITA could be 
called upon to be the carriers of weapons. The women in the areas controlled by UNITA 
were especially exploited since the ideas of military communism of UNITA precluded 
any form of independent thinking. Moreover, in the name of "preserving African 
traditions" African women were called upon to support their own domination. Sexual 
abuse and violence was the norm in the military camps where women, especially the 
younger ones, had no control over their bodies or their lives. The reproductive roles of 
women were seen as an extension of the war effort since women produced the human 
labour necessary for UNITA for the reproduction of new soldiers who were taken from 
their parents at the age of six. Women did the bulk of the portering for the FALA army. 
The war affected women in the rural areas in the most devastating manner. They bore 
the brunt of the hardships imposed by the indiscriminate laying of mines.
The effects of militarism affected women in the areas of MPLA control, though not in 
the same manner since the government tried to effect a new family code to protect the 
rights of women. Though the government enacted a progressive family code in 1990, the 
changes in the legal statutes in relation to the oppression of women in the rural areas 
did not change the deeply ingrained social practices associated with patriarchy. The 
constitutional guarantees of equal rights could not be enacted in the period of warfare 
and dislocation.
While the MPLA gestured toward equality in the law, UNITA invoked African culture 
to justify the subjugation of women. UNITA used starvation as a strategy of war and 
this affected women and children throughout the society. One publication stated that, 
"UNITA has consistently used starvation as a method of combat, in violation of the rules 
of war. UNITA justifies this by claiming that the majority of the population in the 
besieged towns and cities are linked to the military. " UNITA made rural Angolans 
captives in areas that it controlled by refusing the people unhindered safe passage to
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their chosen destination. One effect of this war was to dramatically increase the size of 
the working class both employed and unemployed.
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE URBANIZATION OF ANGOLA
The politics of space and race under colonialism provided one of the clearest issues of 
contention in Angolan society. It was the organization of the labour process and the 
incessant exploitation to which the working poor were subjected which gave rise to the 
awakening of the consciousness of Angolans. The stone towns and the mud towns were 
microcosms of the differences based on class and race. Urbanization, war and class 
formation is an area where more research is necessary. In the post World War II era, 
the working class was concentrated in the mining, plantation, small factories and 
oil-refining sections of the society. The Benguela Railroad and the transport sector had 
led to a high level of mobility of workers hence speeding integration among the working 
class. In cities such as Lobito and Benguela, there was a very skilled and educated section 
of workers. The dock workers also exhibited a high level of political consciousness. They 
were exposed to international commerce and came in contact with other workers who 
reported on other struggles of workers in Africa and beyond.
By the end of the period of South African destruction in the eighties, the Benguela 
Railroad had been halted and the dock workers plagued by low wages and poor working 
conditions. More than 60 per cent of the population now reside in urban areas. The 
growth of musseques in cities such as Luanda was a manifestation of the dispersal of the 
peasantry. Petty trading and the "candonga" market became signals of the hustling 
mentality which corrupted the social structure of the society. Corruption at all levels 
of the bureaucracy and armed forces undermined professionalism by patriotic 
elements. The stagnation of the skills, knowledge and development of this class 
compounded the devaluation of the return for labour. The fact was that the devaluation 
could not be separated from the ways in which productive resources were diverted for 
warfare.
This short sectoral analysis will point out the areas where the workers were to be found 
in the eighties.
• The most stable section of the working class was located in the petroleum industry, 
transportation, the remnants of the plantation and agricultural sector, the small 
industrial sector of textiles, food processing, chemicals, electrical goods, vehicle 
assembly and small-scale enterprises.
• The large numbers of workers in the bureaucracy and conscripted soldiers in the 
armies of FALA and FAPLA.
« Workers in the service sector of the economy, servants, security guards, and other 
workers servicing the foreign peace-keeping and NGO sector.
• One of the striking aspects of Angola is the large numbers of workers who work in 
the so called informal sector as itinerant traders. The money changers at every street 
corner in Luanda are the most visible signs of this strata. Rocque Sentiero in 
Sambizanga is one of the largest markets in Africa, where a million persons pass 
through every day. This major commercial and cultural centre is a microcosm of the 
vibrancy of this sector of the society.
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Yet, it is in this area of the economy where one is exposed to the fiill impliCatioris' of the 
disorganization of the workers unleashed by economic reforms. The problems of health, 
safety and security for members of the working class in this sector compounded the 
general insecurity of war-time conditions. This development also eroded the political 
base of the MPLA in so far as this party had its strength among the organized working 
poor. The disorganization of the working people in the informal sector .is part of a larger 
war against the poor on the African continent.
The liberalization of the economy had a negative effect oh the working class/War time 
shortages of basic commodities ensured that most'commdditiSs^ 
and could be found "only on the parallel market. With' the'’ dawn of the nineties, ‘the 
parallel market' became the principal .'arena for ’ tne iritefface between international 
capital and the "informal sector"‘ with the: US d611arhecbming the prihcipal medium of 
exchange/,Th‘e economic war against the pqof cbmpounded the^weakhess of the people 
6 l Arigola''esple The' limited ‘^ im '^m cfi^erh  'made' by /^golan  \ybmen
in relation to the family code, mmimum wa|es a h d 'h ^  ;‘ ^' yy"
i i  <Ji L ' ‘:> a  .
THE MIDDLE STRATA ^ D  THEiRAMBIVALENGE AS ANTMPORTANT ASPEGT
OF THE WAR hex 'agemoh T sm /I rfkwanr.iuPi rgHiitiqro 1 , m ‘
LY.-V sri£; ;w noiJGitGuC:) to ase:
iu.y! i- (U.-
The poverty of Portugal meant that up to.'l,9l75ip.o.ohjyMtejwdrk^rsThadjcohjpet^<b5?ith 
skilled African workers in the productive,areas of the economy., There were white taxi 
drivers, bricklayers, construction workers and^ members of the lower ranks of the 
•colonial bureaucracy/The. limited e'ducat lbnai opportunifies meant,that the, middie.class
til. ■.*>.! G 1 i.' '.i.; ■ !: . o iJ i ,  i  U i j '..l m i ; . ; ■: '/->; ' K .U; , : ! ; i  - .v  ;; G. i 'J:.: i ; fJ •-: /(;Eurppean, mestizo and.Africanj. was weak.cpmpared to their count^ 
cplpniesV'Teh tlie^assiimljados^’th " ^ ^  .the’rnesbzp
sinimeredunder the weight ofPQrtuguese cplbnialism. The rpteof themissiona 
cruciai in providing limited education to some Africans, especially the sons of chiefs. 
These children internalised.the ideas of White' supremacy andcompeted/with the 
mestizo section of the assimilado population. Both ihe African and the mestizo vyere 
discriminated against by the structures^of White supremacy. The mestizo jaccep^edifie 
myth/of Whne.supefiprity^^and Bldckrmfefionty/.. TO to Africa
butexposuretoSovietMarxismhad proyided/anavenueforanaliiance withthewprkirig 
class in the MPLA. ...... ..........
In the analysis of Warnba, UNITA. >vas rooted among the children of rich peasants who 
were aspiring to become capitalistYarmers/^ The callousness of thelleaders of UNITA 
and the destruction unleashed'against the peasantry demonstrated that this class had no 
sense .of a national consciousness. At independence in ,1975, . the mestizo qnd 
middle-strata elements of the MPLA had to take control of the government bureaucracy 
once the settlers were evacuated to Portugal and South Africa. The peasants could not 
read or write and the working class did not have the skills necessary tq inherit apd to J im  
the colonial apparatus. 'Overnight, young "militants' were given tremendous 
responsibilities. The educated elements who had joined the MPLA found that their 
creativity was stifled by the sterile Marxism of the state. It was a version of history which 
uncritically accepted the European modes of transition as those of Africa and a version 
of materialism which viewed the spiritual values of the African as metaphysics. At the
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end of the period of state control over the economy, this heritage of historical 
materialism had given way to the ideas of neo-liberalism. With the values of private 
accumulation and property gaining ground, corruption became such an established 
aspect of accumulation and class formation that there were deep divisions in this class 
and these divisions were manifest in the fissures in the MPLA. The advent of the parallel 
market gave an edge to the senior cadres who could turn state property into private 
property. The explicit programme of the IMF in the privatisation was for this strata which 
had accumulated in the state to become the local capitalist class.
Corruption, war profiteers and with a small commercial strata operating as middle 
persons between foreign companies, laid the foundations for the creation of a small 
capitalist class of Angolans. This class was embryonic and the economic reforms could 
not accelerate its growth fast enough. African women who dominated the "informal 
sector" were the most active entrepreneurs in the society but the whole administrative 
machinery for economic operations was not organized to support their activities. They 
did not have the collateral to get loans from the banking institutions nor did they have 
the organizational support for insurance, licensing and the other principles necessary to 
set up full-fledged capitalist enterprises. Former bureaucrats and rehabilitated settler 
elements with commercial expertise along with contacts in the import-export sector 
were the most obvious beneficiaries of the liberalization process. The racial 
configuration of capitalist relations with Brazil, Portugal and South Africa ensured the 
ascendancy of a small section of the population. Because of the volume of this 
import-export trade there were some areas of cooperation with local Angolans who were 
to be found in the interstices of the economy.
The fact that the mestizo, White and assimilado elements from the state bureaucracy 
were the most obvious beneficiaries of the primitive accumulation meant that UNITA 
could mobilise the opinion of African peasants against this strata. The manipulation of 
the symbols of African fundamentalism was most obscene since the leadership of this 
party was in no way less compromised by virtue of their linkages with Portuguese and 
South African capital through offshore banking, diamond dealing, arms purchases and 
the transportation of weapons. However, the poor in the urban areas were unaware of 
the extent of these linkages. It was the clear opulence of those in the government which 
alienated large sections of the poor from the political leadership. Satellite television 
antennas, electric generators and individual water pumps, education, holiday and 
hospital care in South Africa and Portugal meant that this strata in both the military 
parties were not as affected as other sections of the population by the war.
One section of this strata which forms part of the class structure of Angolan society is 
the hundreds of international "humanitarian" workers in Angola. These workers form a 
link between international interests and the people, and mediate the external 
involvement in the economy. The project activities of the UN Consolidated 
Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola give a breakdown of these expatriate workers who do 
jobs which would otherwise be done by Angolans. These workers are in the main 
employed by international non governmental agencies and "donor" organizations and 
with their opulent standards of living stand out in the midst of the war and destruction 
in Angola.
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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA.
Angola has always been a rich prize in Africa. The wealth of the country is now legendary 
and after 1975 the petroleum resources produced the anomaly of a "socialist" country 
dominated by the giants of the international oil industry. The names of Chevron, Elf, 
Petrofina, BP, Texaco Petrobas dominated the extraction of petroleum. A similar array 
of forces with names such as DeBeers were involved in the Angolan economy with 
respect to the extraction of diamonds. External domination of the economy has been a 
key factor in the politics of the society. The war in Angola has been fuelled by the 
struggles to control the vast wealth of this society. In this regard peace should be 
measured not so much against the damage or defeat inflicted upon one side, but against 
the extent to which the political goal of empowering the Angolan people is realized.
A quotation of Franz Mehring is here relevant,
War is an explosion of historical contradictions which have sharpened to the point where no other 
means are available for their solution since there are no judges in a class society who can decide 
byjuridical or moral means those conflicts which will be solved by weapons in war. War is therefore 
a political phenomenon, and not juridical, moral or even a penal one. War is not conducted in 
order to punish an enemy for supposed or real sins, but in order to break his resistance to the 
pursuit of one’s own interest. War is not a thing in itself possessing its own goal, it is an organic 
part of a policy to whose presuppositions it remains attached and to whose needs it has to adapt 
its own successes."31
This conception of war is also amplified by the question of the ideas which are at the 
forefront of a war. In Angola, for over 400 years, the principal idea of the African people 
was to free themselves from foreign domination. However, as Cabral maintained, the 
national liberation project in Africa was not revolutionary or socialist. Cabral had 
queried: is the national liberation movement something which has simply emerged from 
within our country, is it a result of the internal conditions created by the presence of 
colonialism, or are there external factors which have determined it? 32 Cabral answered 
his own question by pointing to the internal and external contradictions in the movement 
for national liberation. The external factors were to become more significant in the 
context of Angola after the invasion of South Africa in 1975.
The South African invasion by an army committed to apartheid and colonial rule in 
Namibia changed the whole character of the internal contradictions and the 
contradictions between Angolans and international capital. The war was compounded 
by not only the issues of the Cold War, but also by the issues of the decolonization of 
Namibia and the end of White supremacy and apartheid in Southern Africa. That the 
Cold War was not the central problem was manifest in the intense efforts to destroy 
SWAPO as a national liberation movement and to occupy Southern Angola to prevent 
the consolidation of the struggle for self-determination by SWAPO. In this period, it 
could be said that the MPLA and the Cubans were fighting a just war. The alliance of 
UNITA with the South Africans removed the claims of UNITA that they were a force 
fighting for the dignity of Africans. It was impossible to fight for the dignity of Africans 
while supporting a government which dehumanised Africans in the segregated 
conditions of apartheid.
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The integration of UNITA has been documented by both of the books concerning the 
US intervention in Angola, that of Daniel Spikes and John Stockwell. The details need 
not detain us despite the justification for this integration as presented by the published 
sources sympathetic to UNITA. What is of interest is how this alliance created a 
momentum of war for South African capital and for Armscor even after the attainment 
of majority rule by Africans in South Africa. The alliance between UNITA and South 
African capital and later the MPLA and Executive Outcomes of S A was a manifestation 
of a more profound alliance between elements of the African middle strata and 
international capital. This alliance was disguised in the case of the MPLA in state 
enterprises, but open with the reliance of UNITA on South Africa and Zaire.
The social character of the war determined by the social forces explains the present 
stalemate between the forces of MPLA and UNITA and the inability of either side to 
deliver a decisive end to the conflict. The class which is in power has become less clear 
in its project and this lack of clarity affects the alliances and partners in the war.
To substantiate this statement it is necessary to develop a periodization of the war since 
1961.
• 1961-1974: the war of national liberation with the MPLA emerging as the principal 
force for self-rule.
• 1975-1976: consolidation of the alliance of the MPLA with the people under the 
weight of the South African and Zairian invasion.
• 1981-1988: the threat against the whole society by the South African invasion.The 
. alliance with Cuba to defeat the South African threat.
• The war after 1992 and the reliance of the MPLA on external sources of support to 
repulse the take-over of the majority of the country by UNITA.
The relevant issue for this paper is where did UNITA obtain the requisite military capital 
to take over 70% of the country after the 1992 elections? In order to answer this question 
it is necessary to examine the stakes in Angola and the resources of Angola.
THE STAKES AND THE RESOURCES IN ANGOLA
Angola which lies north of Namibia, is a large territory on the Atlantic Ocean, with 
borders with Zaire and Zambia. Numerous elements have coveted the wealth of this 
society. The long quote from the Economist Intelligence Unit reproduced below gives 
an idea of this wealth.
In theory, Angola should be one of Africa’s richest countries. Few parts of the continent have such 
a favourable resource endowment. Covering 1.25 million Rms (over five times the size of the UK), 
Angola has an abundance of land, only 4 per cent of which is currently estimated to be under 
cultivation. Climatic conditions are generally favourable for agriculture and a very wide range of 
crops can be grown. Besides feeding its own population, Angola could be a large net exporter of 
agricultural produce, and until the troubles of the last decade, it was the world’s fourth largest 
producer of coffee. It also has large livestock resources in the more arid south, extensive forest 
areas' and, off its southern coast, some of the best fishing waters in Africa.
20
Angola is best known as an energy rich country. It has large deposits of oil and gas, and oil has 
been the main export since 1973. In addition, there is vast hydroelectric potential on the country’s 
rivers, which one day could also provide the water for extensive irrigation. Furthermore the subsoil 
is a treasure ground of minerals, and Angola could eventually revert to its traditional role as one 
of the world’s most valuable sources of diamonds. Before independence in 1975, there was a fast 
growing light manufacturing sector (roughly on par with Kenya) and there had been considerable 
investments in railways, roads and other infrastructure'33
The various publications which point to the potential for recovery are important 
documents which can shed light on the vast wealth of the country. The significant point 
which has to be reinforced is that transnational capital has always dominated the 
economy of Angola, even during the period when the MPLA proclaimed itself a Marxist 
Leninist Party. One of the striking features of this period of warfare was that foreign 
capital intensified the extraction of minerals while there was untold destruction of 
human life in the society.
The permanence of the war since 1975 is connected to both the interests of transnational 
capital and the political activities of one of the parties, UNITA. This party has been able 
to continue the war after 1992 because of its control over the vast diamond fields in 
Lund a North Province.
DIAMONDS IN THE ANGOLAN WAR.
"It is widely acknowledged that the kimberlite pipes are believed to be among the world’s 
five richest deposits of embedded diamonds, and it has been forecasted that revenue 
from diamond sales, assuming a cessation of guerrilla war could increase nine fold." 34 
This quotation from a prominent European publication summed up the perspective of 
international investors on the diamond resources of Angola. In 1986, ENDIAMA, the 
state run diamond company signed an agreement with Roan Selection Trust 
International to operate at Kanfunfo in Cuango Province. Output was 2.4 m carats in 
1974, falling to 300,000 carats in 1976, following independence. Production rose to about 
600,000 carats in 1979, and 1.5m in 1980, but declined to an estimated 900,000 carats in 
1985, owing to guerrilla attacks and smuggling. In 1986, when the industry was 
reorganized, output declined further, to only 200,000 carats (less than 0.3% of total 
world output of uncut diamonds). Output is estimated to have recovered sharply to 
nearly lm  carats in 1988 and to 1.3m carats in 1989, although falling to 1.1 m carats in 
1990 and to 960,000 carats in 1991. In 1992 output was estimated to have risen to 2.7 m 
carats. The increase was accounted for by the entry of thousands of small prospectors in 
the region.
On the front page of the New York Times, on September 3 1992, was the picture of the 
prospecting fields of Lunda North in Angola. Under the same picture, which had been 
carried a week earlier in a British newspaper, the caption read:
From the air they look like anthills, tiny pits studding the landscape, evidence of primitive mining 
operations which are shaking the foundations of the world’s most successful De Beers diamond 
empire.
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Below this picture the story started with the alarm that:
An estimated 50,000 diggers are taking part in the diamond rush in northern Angola. Sold and 
bartered locally for a pittance, their gems are flooding into the world diamond-cutting centre of 
Antwerp at a valuation of some $500 million a year forcing DeBeers to buy them up in an anxious 
effort to protect the market. The strain on the corporation’s finances recently sent shares crashing 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
These newspaper articles in London and New York expressed the anxiety of 
international capital over what would happen once Angolans had gone from fighting 
each other to mining the minerals under their soil and rivers. The issue of the Angolan 
peasants versus the monopoly of DeBeers was one of the unspoken issues of the Angolan 
war. The alarm which was raised in Johannesburg, Geneva, Tel Aviv, London and New 
York was masked in other phrases when it came to how the West wanted a resolution 
of the military struggles in a way which would strengthen the control of DeBeers of the 
mining operations in both Angola and Zaire. The war prevented the stabilization of the 
diamond marketing.
The alarm raised in the New York Times also pointed to the potentialities of the 
Angolan economy if the people of Angola were to gain control of that economy. It is 
precisely for this reason that the stakes are so high in the Angolan war. The United 
States had long known of the rich potential of Southern Africa. Geologists know that 
because of the age of the African continent, the area from southern Zaire down to South 
Africa is one of the richest in minerals in the world. The satellite maps taken of the 
geological make-up of the region by the USA had shown that one of the richest veins of 
kimberlite lay at the border between Zaire and Angola.
The intense fight for Canfunfo (1992-1994) represented a mirror of the struggle to 
determine which section of the future Angolan ruling class would control the sales of 
diamonds. This intense struggle was one of the real stumbling blocks to the peaceful 
implementation of the Lusaka Accords. It has been interpreted that the technical issues 
of demobilization and the quartering of FALA were the real stumbling blocks, but the 
question of control of the diamond fields is one of the unresolved issues of the unwritten 
clauses of national reconciliation.
Under the MPLA government, the state-run organization, Endiama, had the sole right 
to sell diamonds internationally. By the end of 1991, there were many diamonds in local 
hands that in order to put some "rationality" into this enterprise, the state passed a law 
which gave individuals the right to own and sell diamonds. The law said that it was legal 
for Angolans to possess uncut diamonds and sell it to the state-run monopoly, Endiama. 
The only constraint was that individuals could not export diamonds.
When the Bicesse Accords were signed in 1991, many unemployed Angolans and 
demobilized soldiers went to Lunda North to take part in the mining operations. 
Agricultural production was made risky by the land mines. Many coffee farmers who 
had fled to Zaire returned to seek wealth in digging for diamonds. In a short period, 
there were over 50,000 prospectors involved in the frontier spirit of the region. The 
diamond cartel of DeBeers is opposed to the operation of market forces in Angola, if 
the Angolans are to be effective actors in the market. In order to be on the safe side 
during the 1992 election campaign, the company provided a house for Jonas Savimbi in 
Luanda.
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The language of restructuring the diamond industry and attracting foreign investors is 
found in the major publications dealing with the reconstruction of Angola after the 
peace. This is the language which will be used to justify the physical removal of the 
thousands of Africans who are attempting to earn their livelihood as prospectors in their 
own country. Part of the dialectic of this process is that this very same enterprise is 
helping to shape the process of class formation in Angola. Those who enriched 
themselves illegally and now feel confident will align themselves with international 
capital and call for the rationalization of the industry. Others, with guns are trying to 
compete through sheer force. The frontier spirit of Lucapa hides the deep divisions 
between the government and UNIT A. The airstrip and the town remained in the hands 
of the government while the territory outside the town was held by UNITA. Diamonds, 
guns, unemployment and hundreds of ex-soldiers provide the ingredients for 
warlordism.
The potentialities of cooperation between democratic governments in Southern Africa 
are tremendous because the countries of the region produce over 60 per cent of the 
diamonds for the world market. Real economic integration and cooperation between 
South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Tanzania and Zaire could have a decisive 
impact on the international marketing of diamonds. This is one of the major issues of 
war and destabilization in Southern Africa. The issue of diamonds can partially explain 
the vigilance of certain elements of the past South African regime with respect to the 
fortunes of peace and war. The question of the future content of democracy in Zaire is 
also linked to the issue of the sale of diamonds.
THE WAR AND THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES
The petroleum industry is the sole economic mainstay of the government, with petroleum 
extraction, refining and distribution constituting Angola’s most important economic activity. 
Hydrocarbons generally accounted for more than 90% of total exports during the 1980s. The 
petroleum sector provided for more than 50% of state revenues and about 30% of GDP. Total 
proven reserves of crude petroleum were estimated at 1,818 m barrels in 1991.
Though Angola is a major exporter of petroleum products, the wars in the country 
prevented it from becoming a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).
The whole apparatus for export and marketing of petroleum products exposes the 
alliance between the local political leadership and transnational capital. The petroleum 
sector is dominated by Chevron (formerly Gulf Oil) of the USA, which accounts for over 
two-thirds of the total output. The other concessions are held by Agip, Elf Aquitaine, 
Conoco, and Texaco. The state- owned oil company is also participating as a minor actor 
in partnership with Petrobas of Brazil.
The reality that the oil industry was not really affected by the war was noted by a major 
publication which pointed to the new concessions granted to Occidental of the USA, 
British Petroleum and Petrofina. After citing the figures of increased production since
1992, this publication noted that, "The oil industry appeared relatively unaffected by the 
resumption of hostilities in late 1992, despite the capture of the northern town of Soyo 
(responsible for about one third of Angola’s output) by UNITA for two months in early
1993. "35
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The fact that the major portion of this oil is exported as crude to the United States makes 
the US one of the parties most interested in the actual strength of the forces at war and 
the issues of peace. During the period of the South African invasion, there was the 
situation of Cuban troops guarding the oil installations from attacks of elements 
financed by the United States government. Similarly, in 1993, one of the sternest 
warnings to UNITA came from President Clinton warning of grave consequences if 
UNITA attacked the oil installations in Cabinda.
The Angolan province of Cabinda is a microcosm of the stakes in the war. In the words 
of Wamba Dia Wamba, "it became a field of imperialist maneuvers." Wamba had 
pointed to the multiple interests of the USA, France (in particular the interests of 
Elf-Congo), Zaire, Gabon and the Angolan peoples in this province. The splits and 
shifting alliances of the movements and the government in this province are tied to the 
intense external involvement in this rich province where the people are very poor. One 
legitimate grievance of the people of Cabinda is the fact that this area is one of the most 
underdeveloped in the country, yet it is the province which provides most of Angola’s 
wealth. The tensions from this anomaly are aggravated by the intense interests of 
member states of the European Union which have an interest in dominating the rich 
resources of Congo, Cabinda, Zaire and Angola.
All the authorities on the Angolan economy point to the fact that the government 
bartered the revenues from oil for the next seven years in order to fight the war against 
UNITA. The point which is here important is how the wealth of diamonds and oil were 
recycled to the arms manufacturers of the advanced capitalist countries. It is the nature 
of the weapons systems which shaped the strategies of the combatants in the war. The 
small manufacturing and trading sector of the economy was financed by the export of 
oil and diamonds.
The industrial activity of Angola is based on construction materials, petroleum refining, 
food processing, textiles, equipment for the petroleum industry, electrical goods and 
vehicle assembly. The ravages of war have meant that this sector of the economy has 
stagnated with production seriously affected by the shortages of raw materials and the 
poor working conditions. The wretched conditions of the labour process inhibited the 
kind of contribution from the working people which would have harnessed the resources 
of the society to resist foreign military intervention. The stagnation of the industrial and 
agricultural sectors reflected the weakness of internal accumulation. The dispersal of 
the peasantry has created a large dependence on food imports. More than two-thirds of 
the country’s food requirements are now imported and the distribution of food during 
the war exposed how food was a weapon of war in Africa.
THE STRATEGIES OF WAR IN ANGOLA.
The art of strategy is to determine the aim which is, or should be, inherently political; to derive 
from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved, to assess these objectives as to the 
military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievements of each is likely 
to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart 
from the process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.
This quotation with respect to the Second World War is useful to understanding how 
military means are used to advance a given political goal.
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In the experience of Angola the clearest political goal was peace and self-determination. 
Yet, as Cabral warned, there were many interests involved in supporting national 
liberation. Cabral had pointed out that though the leaders of the national liberation 
struggles pick up arms, they were armed militants and not militarists. From the point 
of view of the working poor, the objective of liberation was to rid themselves of foreign 
domination. This political goal as the core of the military strategy of the people and 
government of Angola was clear up to 1992. The military journals of the FAPLA boasted 
of the growth of the army from a guerrilla organization to a standing army. By tracing 
its origins in the guerrilla war, the MPLA was at that time reasserting its strategy of 
depending on the people of Angola for support. In the words of the official history of 
FAPLA,
After the various truces of July 1974 and the agreement of 21 October officializing these truces 
between the MPLA and the Portuguese Armed Forces, the Struggle changes in form. So the 
guerrilla forces became a regular army whose aim is the defence of independence, territorial 
integrity and the sovereignty of the new state.36
The transformation of this insurgent army into a conventional force was a process which 
was itself fuelled by the need to fight a defensive war. Slowly, during the eighties under 
the threat and reality of South African occupation, the forces of FAPLA began to acquire 
the kind of weapons which could repulse the South African invasion. The acquisition of 
tanks, combat vehicles, rocket launchers, jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and 
sophisticated anti-aircraft radars created the conditions for a new hierarchy in the 
military. This hierarchy was the mirror of the deepening class cleavages in the MPLA. 
This army did not inherit the Portuguese military traditions. Unlike Zimbabwe, Namibia 
' and South Africa where former guerrillas were integrated into the former colonial 
military structures, FAPLA developed as an army whose strategy was based on 
defending the gains of political independence. This political strategy which guided the 
military operations was accentuated by the clarity of the goal of supporting the 
independence of Namibia. Despite the sophisticated weaponry and the large 
expenditure on weapons, FAPLA until 1992 was a coherent army. The heavy 
expenditure on sophisticated weapons meant that over the period 1981 to 1988 the 
soldiers in FAPLA were limited in their flexibility and response to the South African 
conventional occupation and the flexible war (conventional and guerrilla) of UNIT A. 
The alliance with Cuba mitigated the corrosive effects of heavy expenditure on weapons.
This alliance did not affect the military strategy which had been spelt out in the FAPLA 
Proclamation. The Cubans had long-standing relations with the principal liberation 
movements of Africa. The Cuban army, like the Angolan’s, had been transformed from 
being a guerrilla army to a conventional force capable of defending territorial 
sovereignty. The economic and cultural blockade of Cuba by the US had given a clear 
anti-imperialist character to the ideology of the Cuban armed forces. It was this clarity 
of purpose which led to the sterling resistance to the forays of the South Africans in 
Operation Askari and the crushing humiliation of the South African armed forces at 
Cuito Cuanavale.37
In fact, one of the weakness of the South African campaign in Angola was the lack of 
clarity of the political objectives. At Cuito Cuanavale the South Africans had been 
deceived by their own propaganda as their operational objectives were unclear. On the 
one hand the psychological warfare section of the military had said that South Africa 
had intervened in Angola to defend UNITA and to fight communism, but the massive
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preparations which went into the war demonstrated a different political objective, that 
of setting up a provisional government and capturing the logistics and command centre 
of the Angolans at Menongue.
This lack of clarity on the part of the South Africans flowed directly from the 
contradictions of the politics of apartheid and colonialism. The military strategies which 
flowed from the desire to maintain White domination in Southern Africa contradicted 
the political objectives of international capital which wanted to groom a class, of African 
entrepreneurs with a stake in the future of capitalism in Africa. In this sense, the 
contradictions between the political and military strategies of the West were 
compounded by the fact that Africans decided to fight for independence in Namibia and 
continued the fight against White rule in South Africa.
It is worth recalling the decisive battles in the war for Angola since 1975. These battles 
were at Quifangondo in 1975, when the Angolans and Cubans repelled the South 
Africans, Zairians and mercenaries from the USA, the battle at Cuito Cuanavale, the 
battle for Luena in 1991, the battles for Kuito and Huambo in 1994. Africans were 
defending their right to independence and in all wars, defensive war is a higher form of 
warfare if both sides have the same weapons. The involvement of the Cubans in 
1987-1988 exposed the fact that there was nothing superior about Whites in the handling 
of weapons. Cuito Cuanavale was the turning point in the history of Southern Africa.
The issue of the political and military strategy for a society is here important in the search 
for peace. In the war after 1992, the forces of MPLA had been demobilised. The soldiers 
who were the veterans of Cuito Cuanavale had been re-integrated into civilian life. In 
one sense, there are those who argue that the Bicesse Accords were meant to dismantle 
the military infrastructure of FAPLA which defeated the South Africans. When UNITA 
seized more than 60 per cent of the country, the government was on the defensive. 
Instead of developing a political strategy to guide the military response to the aggression 
of UNITA, the government signed a contract worth more than US$20 million with a 
private South African company. The shift in the political outlook and the military 
strategy of the government can be seen from its alliance with the former soldiers of the 
SADF who were organized in a private force called Executive Outcomes.
In the words of one publication, .
A South African ’security consultant’ firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), has apparently provided 
armed personnel to assist both UNITA and government forces. In late 1992 and in early 1993, EO 
was providing assistance to UNITA on contract. Then, in February 1993, the government hired 
100 expatriate armed personnel through EO to protect privately-owned oil installations in Soyo. 
Thus in the first quarter of 1993, EO employees found themselves assisting operations against each 
other.38
The reliance of the MPLA government on Executive Outcomes was a manifestation of 
the changed political and ideological conditions among the leaders of this party. 
Executive Outcomes is part of the political strategy of international capital to have a 
privatised army in the region after the coming to power of majority rule in South Africa. 
In the dying days of the apartheid regime, the former Minister of Defence, Magnus 
Malan, proclaimed the success of the privatization exercise in South Africa. The 
military, in collaboration with elements of manufacturing and mining capital,, have 
established a key-points strategy. Under this strategy private security firms were 
established where select elements of the all white army have been kept intact. While 
there has been the public report of the demobilization of some of the more notorious
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forces such as the 32nd battalion and the other elements of Koevet who repaired to 
South Africa (from independent Namibia), there are elements of the military who have 
been deployed in other areas such as the National Parks. Others later regrouped under 
the name of Executive Outcomes. The General Manager of this "private army," Eben 
Barlow, had formerly been a Lt. Col in the 32nd Battalion, the unit which had been used 
by the South African army in its war of destabilization.
The soldiers recruited for this force were outcasts of the SADF who would not. have 
been integrated into the armed forces after the coming to power of the government of 
national unity led by Nelson Mandela. South African law barred former South Africans 
military personnel from operating in other countries, but EO gained a lucrative contract; 
in Angola and later Sierra Leone. This development provided a logical continuity with' 
the imperatives of militarization which had developed during apartheid. Though’, the, 
government of South Africa as a member of the OAU was supposed to be working for 
peace, its nationals were fighting in Angola and the state corporation was selling 
weapons to UNITA.
The other component of the military strategy of international capital in Southern Africa 
is the support by external forces for the very large military base which is being built in 
Botswana. It was not insignificant that Executive Outcomes was fighting on the side of 
UNITA and later threw their complete support behind the government of Angola after 
the government of the United States recognized the MPLA in 1993. By this time the 
soldiers who had experience from the battles of 1975 to 1988 had been demobilized.
The strategy of war of the MPLA after 1992 was the logic of the dependence on 
conscription and big military budgets. Instead of trying to learn from the local 
experience of those soldiers with both the experience of guerrilla and conventional war 
(the veterans of Cuito Cuanavale), the Angolan government invested its energies in 
changing the clause of the Bicesse Accords which had prohibited both UNITA and the 
MPLA from acquiring new supplies of weapons. Between 1992 and 1994 the strategy of 
the MPLA was based on the acquisition of over US$3.5 billion worth of weapons. One 
commentator who carried out research on the weapons procurement by the Angolan 
government concluded that, "The government has unquestionably been the largest arms 
purchaser in Sub-Saharan Africa during the past two years.”39
In this binge of mortgaging the resources of the society for instruments of death instead 
of providing for social services, the soldier was seen as the instrument of the weapon 
system.This conception affected the confidence of the ruling party in the ability of its 
soldiers to fight UNITA. At the diplomatic level this strategy led to the MPLA 
government hiring the same public relations firm in the USA which had been deployed 
by conservative Republicans to sanitise the image of UNITA. The military alliance 
between the MPLA and Executive Outcomes was a mirror of the new class alliances 
within the Angolan society. Up to 1992, it could be said that the MPLA was fighting a 
just war. The fact that war was not a moral question was exposed after the elections in 
1992 when it was clear that Jonas Savimbi and UNITA rejected the results of 
internationally supervised elections. That UNITA could resort to war and receive 
support was an indication of the international alliance which was put in place to have 
UNITA control the government.
The decisive intervention of the Angolan people in the electoral process had led to the 
political defeat of UNITA in the parliamentary and Presidential elections. The MPLA 
was surprised by the outcome of the elections. The reform programmes which had been
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implemented since ,1991 had eroded the political base of the former liberation 
movement, but the poor understood that the militarism of UNITA was worse than the 
bureaucratic commahdism of the MPLA. The people waited hours to vote and the 
symbolism of this process was captured by the woman who gave birth to her child while 
waiting to vote.. She named the child "Vote."
Despite the confidence expressed by the population as reflected !iri the1 election Tesiilts, 
MPLA had lost its coherence and discipline so that it could not politically mobilise the 
people to fight UNITA. This lack of discipline could ibenseen in November 1992 and 
January 1993 when innocent civilians were killed because they were suspected of being 
Zairians. This massacre of innocent civilians on ethnic grounds could be compared to  
1975 when Zairian troops had been involved in aninvasionJfcthe countryjlbistnyasion 
did not prompt any such reprisal because at that historical;moment, the -MPLArwas a 
disciplined party with a clear political strategy of building national sovereignty beyond 
the politics of ethnicity. By the period of the economic reforms, th& top leadership of 
the MPLA was interested in building a capitalist class and this broke the’’discipline and 
coherence with its former, political base in the muss,eqj^s.: 
issued a report condemning the "spontaneous killing" !j.of’. ^  
of ethnic identification had become a factor of the war,
which had taken place earlier in the capital, Luanda. *Ul^l|rA sought tiD ^ ^ a ^ iU ite g e  
of this indiscipline and termed the killing "ethnic cleansm^,"r ^ i s  episode, \yas ,a olje.ar 
indication of the level of authority of the MPLA in ’ther^ p^^rg3§-*"^ fTC,T; '!-
Because the stakes are so^iigh,4nternational capital isrSfilljmsui^oif^^^ 
of Angolan society underThe "leadership of the ^usaljta;
provided the basis for. an alliance between emerging class elem ^t£infU N IT^an 
MPLA. Since 1992 tliere: has been no major 4isagre,^ep.t^Dety^j^^i 'jy fJT f^^d^the 
MPLA on the question of the future r^latioi^ship .^ he^ y£tst
mineral resources and Angolan'society. On the contra^, t f i ^
investments were safe under their leadership. Yet, the/old hostility. tq4heM Pl^,r;emain 
and this is manifest in the propaganda of UNITA which, continues, tqxall the MPLAja 
communist party. This declaration of Jonas Savimbi in h is l^ e w ^ '^  
over Portuguese media was an effort to again woo the conservative forces that had 
emerged stronger in the politics of the USA after Ndvembefi;199^J 'oa] iC' 1 n -1:1 **'•' l
■to i
The insurgency in Cabinda is also held in reserve to destabilise the;goyerflmdnlnifd^? 
process of class formation is not to the advantage o f theAVest. Ipprderdpvspejed^up ^his 
process there are major fissures in the MPLA and this:has,ied.to thp equivocationpf the 
USA over the deployment of peace keepers to monitor'the 1994 Accords, ...... ,’r
THE STRATEGY OF UNITA
The political and military strategy of UNITA can be grasped from the shifting alliances 
that this party had made since its formation in 1966. Initially,{this party was aligned with 
SWAPO and had sought to be considered as one of the leading forces for African 
liberation. There had been persistent reports of an alliance,between UNITA and the 
colonial army during the independence period. William Minter in his study of Operation 
Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier, produced some of the evidence of the
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collaboration between Jonas Savimbi and the Portuguese. Though this account tended 
to personalise the political party of UNITA, this background helped to clarify the 
subsequent alliance with South Africa between 1975 and 1993. After the defeat of 
Portugal and the withdrawal of the settlers, UNITA joined the South Africans to fight 
SWAPO. The alliance with the apartheid regime formed the core of the politico-military 
strategy of this formation from 1975 to 1993. Studies by journalists and academics who 
journeyed to Jamba have pointed to the ways in which the organization of FALA was 
transformed from a guerrilla army to an army integrated into the command structure of 
the apartheid special forces.
The military organization of FALA also reflected the contradictions between the 
political propaganda of African fundamentalism and the reliance on the support of 
White supremacists. This alliance also influenced the weapon systems and the form of 
the military organization. W. James Martin in his study of APolitical History of the Civil 
War in Angola 1974-1990 gives a clear picture of the military organization and how the 
external training in the USA and Morocco influenced the military strategies of this army. 
He outlined that,
By 1984, UNITA military forces were structured along guidelines used by most Western armies. 
FALA’s high command consisted of Savimbi as Supreme Commander and a headquarters staffed 
by the Chief of Staff and Chiefs of Intelligence, Personnel, Operations and Logistics... By 1990, 
FALA boasted 20,000 regular troops, 18,000 semi regulars, 20,000 compact guerrillas and as many 
as 35,000 dispersed guerrillas. All in all, it is a highly motivated and professional force... The sum 
total of UNITA troop strength would place it at 71,000 troops. Other estimates of UNITA’s military 
strength range from 28,000 to 90,000.4°
The military position of UNITA was enhanced by the support from the Departments of 
Defence in Washington and South Africa. During the period of the Cold War, UNITA 
was organized as a form of proto state, with all of the structures of banks, satellite 
communications systems, radio station, trading structures, links to international 
diamond cartels and an army to wage conventional warfare. This form of conventional 
warfare had been reinforced by the dependence of this army for training, logistics, 
command and control. FALA as the military wing of UNITA was far more organized 
than the political wing of the party. This was borne out by the militaristic posture of 
UNITA during the 1992 election campaign. UNITA as a political party did enjoy some 
political support, especially from those in the population who were exercised by the 
corruption and accumulation by the government. The extent of the support was manifest 
in the elections.
The influence of militarists in the ranks of UNITA meant that it did not fully demobilize 
its army in the period before the elections. Under the Bicesse Accords, the Armed 
Forces of Angola (FAA) was supposed to consist of an army of 50,000 soldiers, 20,000 
from FAPLA and FALA with an air force of 6,000 and a navy of 4,000. By the date of 
the elections of September 1992, UNITA had only demobilized 11,106 of its 90,000 
troops.41 The other soldiers had been held in reserve in Zaire to resume the war. In 
October, 11 generals of UNITA withdrew from the combined army and on October 31, 
full-scale war broke out again. Though there were those elements in UNITA who had 
wanted peace to take up their seats in the new parliament, the preparations which had 
been made by UNITA to win militarily at all cost led to the outbreak of the war when it 
was found out that UNITA lost the 1992 general elections. The heavy investment of the 
US military in the war in Angola was an important influence on the leadership of
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UNITA. Between 1986 and 1992, the assistance to UNITA by the US military was over 
US$250 million. Because so much of the literature on the war in Angola (in the English 
and French languages) is dominated by the West and those who support UNITA, it has 
been difficult to chart the real history of UNITA since its inception in 1966. Conservative 
Republicans in the USA never forgot the defeat in 1975 and these elements were at the 
forefront of supporting UNITA. The supply of Stinger missiles and other sophisticated 
weapons helped to change the political and military character of UNITA. This form of 
weaponry and the reliance on foreign sources led UNITA to take on an offensive strategy 
in the battles of Luena in 1991 and in all the major battles since 1993. It was this 
transformation into a conventional force which dictated the brutal occupation of the 
cities in the 1992 to 1994 war. The battle of Huambo in 1994 was decisive in the exposure 
. of the degeneration of the militarists and the divisions in the party.
This degeneration had been clear in the city sieges and the ways in which UNITA carried 
the war against the civilians. A publication whose authors had been able to visit 
UNITA-controlled zones during the war pointed out that
"UNITA has been guilty of horrendous violations of war, including direct attacks on civilians, 
indiscriminate shelling, summary executions, mutilation of corpses, starvation of civilians, hostage 
taking, forced portering, recruitment of child soldiers, denial of the freedom of movement and 
blockage of relief aid." _
A CAPITAL-INTENSIVE WAR
Armaments are destructive and are paid for out of surpluses from the society. Angola 
was spending over 50 per cent of its budget oh weapons. Added to this were the resources 
being expended by UNITA. Military spending is therefore a drain on productive 
resources. Armaments never re-enter the production process as a means of production 
or consumption. In fact, warfare in the case of Angola represented a cancerous drain on 
the society as a whole. Because the entire cost of armaments was paid for by resources 
which could otherwise have gone to the reconstruction of the society, the purchase of 
armaments by both UNITA and the MPLA represented a deduction from the surpluses 
available in the society. The main beneficiaries of the arms procurement in this period 
were arms manufacturers outside of Africa. One publication, in citing the various 
suppliers of weapons to Angola, pointed out that in this period, Angola was Africa’s 
number one arms buyer and that the government mortgaged the next seven years of oil 
production to finance the purchase of armaments.
In the period 1981 to 1988 the South Africans had developed the G-5 and G-6 155-mm 
long range artillery and had dubbed this weapon, the "best gun in any army in the world." 
The development of this weapon had emerged after the first defeat of the South Africans 
in Angola when their mercenary soldiers retreated in the face of the 122-mm rockets 
which were then in use by the MPLA. This weapon, a truck mounted multiple-rocket 
launcher, was old, dating back to the Second World War, and had assisted the Soviets 
in defeating fascism. Officially called BM-21 Katyushas, the weapon had been dubbed 
"Stalin Organs" and became even more famous in Africa after the 1975-1976 battles in 
Angola. Armscor had gone about developing the G-155 mm gun howitzer to confront 
the Stalin Organs. The G-5 towed field artillery piece and its derivative, the G-6, were 
the most publicised projects in the history of the South African arms industry. The details 
of how South Africa acquired the technology for this weapon exposed how Armscor was
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integrated into the military industrial complex of Western Europe and North America'43 
Though the capital intensity of the weapons in the Angolan war was not in the same 
league as the cruise missiles and other derivatives of the Star War tests against Iraq, the 
nature of the weapons was significant in a society where the technology of agricultural 
production was the hoe.
The military strategy of UNITA in war forced the pace of the acquisition of weapons by 
the government. After 1993, the war in Angola continued to be a capital-intensive war 
where the arms manufacturers of the West made super profits. Two of the books on 
warfare in Angola provide an inventory of the weapons systems employed by the armies 
and airforces in the war. In the South African account of Cuito Cuanavale War in 
Angola: The Final South African Phase by Helmoed-Romer Heitman, there is a 
complete inventory of the equipment of both sides. This inventory exposed the road 
from the AK 47 to the sophisticated weapons which were deployed in this historic battle. 
Similarly, the publication on Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War 
outlines the procurement mechanisms of both the government and UNITA. Though this 
publication is in essence a cover for the resort to war by UNITA, it helps to underscore 
how UNITA was able to obtain weapons in spite of the sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations in 1993.
Mary Kaldor, in her analysis of the relationship between warfare and capitalism, 
underscored the role of war in the accumulation process of Western arms 
manufacturers. The conventional war in Angola registered as a destructive factor in the 
society, especially for the working poor and the soldiers conscripted by both sides.
Armaments are a means of destruction and they can never re-enter the production process as a 
means of consumption. In any society warfare is parasitical, dependent upon the productive 
possibilities of society as a whole. The most that warfare can do is to create the conditions for its 
own reproduction'44
There are two points which are worth noting from this quotation, (a) the fact that warfare 
is parasitical and (b) that warfare tries to create its own reproduction. The fact that 
warfare created the conditions for its own reproduction was most manifest by the 
involvement of Armscor in the war in Angola. Despite the fact that the Government 
of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela was committed to securing peace, the logic 
of the supply of weapons to UNITA by Armscor which had been going on for over ten 
years, meant that the stakes were so high that this company defied the government of 
Mandela and supplied weapons to UNITA despite the UN arms embargo. The UN arms 
embargo, though it was politically important in the diplomatic battles, it was ineffective 
in military terms. Members of the Security Council were supplying weapons to UNITA 
via Zaire. They included the French government even though it is a permanent member 
of the Security Council. One report exposed how the French government diverted arms 
meant for the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda to UNITA via Zaire after the downing 
of the plane of the President of Rwanda in April 1994.45
The two points of Kaldor are central to the delays in the implementation of the Lusaka 
Accords and the fact that there are social forces inside and outside Angola with a vested 
interest in the continuation of war.
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THE QUESTION OF PEACE IN ANGOLA
The war in Angola throws up the whole issue of the meaning of peace in Africa. The 
analysis so far has shown that there are social forces inside and outside Angola with a 
vested interest in warfare. There are also social forces in Angola and Southern Africa 
with a vested interest in peace. The problem has been that those who want peace are 
the poor, tired soldiers, women and the working people and they do not have control 
over the means of communication. The level of economic and cultural integration in 
Southern Africa has always been high. After the guns are silenced in Angola, the region 
of Southern Africa has the potential to be one of the most peaceful with the conditions 
for supporting the mechanisms of the OAU for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution.
Since 1991, the peoples of Angola placed tremendous trust in the peace-keeping 
capabilities of the United Nations. The United Nations had been. established as a 
peace-keeping institution in the aftermath of World War II. The first purpose of the UN 
listed in its charter is:
to maintain international peace and security and to that end to take effective collective measures 
for the removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to the breach of the peace.
In the experience of peace-keeping in Africa, the record of the UN has been inglorious 
from the period of the Western invasion of the Congo and the murder of Patrice 
Lumumba to the failed effort in Somalia which ended in March 1995. The reality has 
been that in the case of Africa, the keeping of peace is subordinated to the wishes of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. The contradictions between the objectives 
of peace keeping and the dictates of the permanent members were exposed when the 
UN proved incapable to intervene to suppress the acts of aggression by the apartheid 
government in South Africa.
The first major involvement of the UN in peace-keeping in Angola was with respect to 
the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola. This mandate was consistent with the 
mission of the USA which saw the Cubans as a threat to Western influence in Africa. 
The smoothness of the operations of United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(UNAVEM) (1988-1991) had prompted the Angolans to rely on the UN to implement 
the Bicesse Accords. The expectations of the government of Angola were different from 
those of UNITA. For UNITA and its external supporters in the USA and South Africa, 
the withdrawal of the Cubans now opened the way for the Western military victory over 
the "Soviet" supported FAPLA army. On the other hand, the Angolan government 
expected to be treated as a sovereign country with the UN respecting the spirit and letter 
of the Accord. The record is now clear that the war never ceased in spite of the 
peace-keeping efforts of the UN. The major limitation was that this concept of peace 
was based on the silencing of weapons and not on the building of structures for peace.
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The components of the peace agreement were:
• Ceasefire.
• Demobilization of the army.
• Creation of a new army before elections.
• Registration and elections.
• The swearing in of a new parliament based on multi-party democracy.
The ceasefire did take place however, there were numerous violations of the ceasefire 
but the UN Special Representative turned a blind eye to them. At that time, the 
Republicans were still in power in the USA and it was expected that UNITA would win 
the elections. This posture had been clear two years earlier after the first meeting 
between Jonas Savimbi and Dos Santos at Gbadolite in Zaire. At this meeting hosted 
by the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, there was an agreement drawn up before 
a dozen African heads of state for Savimbi to withdraw from the country before 
competing "on equal terms" for political office. Most Africans could not perceive 
Mobutu as a peace maker and neither Savimbi nor his supporters in the USA "were 
prepared for any outcome to peace except one which guaranteed bringing him to power. 
The US officials openly said that Savimbi must be at least Vice- President." This was the 
same position taken by diplomats and even the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
after UNITA lost the elections in 1992. There were no attempts to sanction Savimbi, 
there were always plans to reward his movement for destruction.
It is out of the scope of this paper to interrogate the failure and incompetence of the UN 
in the period of the 1992 elections. There has been a spate of articles on this saga by 
Victoria Brittain and both UNITA and the MPLA have their version of the reasons for 
the failure. This author has also presented an analysis of the UN and Angola'46 The 
incapacity of the UN to implement the Peace Accords could be seen in three main areas, 
(a) the refusal of UNITA to allow the government to restore control over one-third of 
the territory, (b) the refusal of UNITA to surrender heavy arms to the UN, and (c) the 
failure to demobilise the bigger part of the army of UNITA. The important point which 
is relevant is that the ambivalence of the UN was based on the real interests of the 
conservative elements of the USA in Angola.
All of the major supporters of UNITA intensified their activities in the aftermath of the 
elections when it was clear that the results were unfavourable to UNITA. The Foreign 
Minister of South Africa, representing a government with no democratic traditions, flew 
to Angola to support peace talks. Sean Cleary, a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in South Africa, drew up a "concept paper" on power-sharing which would have 
placed the most important ministries in the hands of UNITA. Subsequently, reports 
from the South African press exposed the fact that at the very moment that Pik Botha 
and Sean Cleary were supposed to be arbitrating for peace, weapons were being loaded 
for UNITA via Zaire.47 The activities of the South Africans and the representatives of 
the USA demonstrated how peace keeping was an important aspect of low- intensity 
warfare. In the doctrine of low-intensity warfare, peace keeping operations are
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"military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore or maintain 
peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Typically, such operations are sponsored by the 
United Nations or some other supranational agency, and are conducted by multinational forces 
of which the US contingent is a part. Peace keeping represents a legitimate means for protecting 
US interests in the Third World."48
The objectives of the US peace keeping operations were to further the interest of the 
allies of the US. The subordination of the UN to the interests of the USA was exposed 
in the peace discussions in Abidjan after the outbreak of the war. The Special 
Representative of the UN took a back seat while the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
of the USA, Jeffery Davidow, worked out an accord which would have rewarded UNITA 
for going back to war.49 Despite the intense pressures by a dying President of the Ivory 
Coast, Houphouet Boigny, and the capitulation of the MPLA, UNITA refused to accept 
the arrangements of Abidjan. The leadership of UNITA was confident that they would 
have won because they had held back the bulk of their army from the demobilization 
exercises in 1992. By May 1993, a new administration in Washington had recognised the 
MPLA government for the first time. There was however the anomaly of the White 
House seeking to support peace while the US military and intelligence institutions were 
supporting UNITA.
The resources from the petroleum industry assisted the MPLA to recover militarily. 
Both the diplomatic and military initiatives of the Angolan government were now 
bearing fruit. Western countries such as Britain lifted the ban on the selling of weapons 
to the MPLA. The recovery, coupled with the intense diplomatic activities of the 
government along with the governments of Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), led the UN to impose sanctions on UNITA in 1993. However, the military 
supply lines of UNITA demonstrated that UNITA had the financial, military, political 
and propaganda resources to withstand international sanctions.
The war of destruction in Angola has been spectacular to the extreme in the ways in 
which the firepower and mines have affected the poorest Angolans. It is usually said 
that in war the rich and the middle classes are not as affected as the poor. This has been 
very true in Angola. The figures on amputees is only a glimpse of the larger horror of 
the organized and sustained violence of coercion in that society. And yet, the spirit of 
the people was not broken. It is this spirit which is the main inspiration for the pursuit 
of peace in that society. This spirit was exhibited by the people of Kuito who opposed 
the capture of the city by UNITA even though FALA reduced the city to rubble. The 
siege of Kuito exposed the destructiveness of the capital intensive war and should have 
exposed the hollow claim that UNITA was supported by the Ovimbundu. Both Kuito 
and Huambo are supposed to be the heartland of the Ovimbundu people, the ethnic 
group for which UNITA was supposed to be fighting. The people of these towns 
suffered the worst instances of the violations of war by UNITA.
Three factors forced the Lusaka accords in 1994, the reinvigoration of FAA, the 
disintegration of UNITA and the changed political situation in the FLS. These changes 
were dialectically related and the present impasse stems from the fact that there are 
sections of the West who are still not certain that MPLA is sincere in its cry to support 
the operation of market forces. The limited memory of the government is now manifest 
in the confidence which is being invested in the Security Council of the UN as an agency 
for peace. This can be seen from the ways in which the protocols of Lusaka seek to repeat 
the same procedures for demobilization as those of 1992.
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The elements of the protocol should be studied by intellectuals in the region who want 
to influence the peace process. The principal items relate to the completion of the 
Abidjan agreements in relation to the Bicesse Accords and the Security Council 
resolutions on Angola. There are five main issues in this protocol with deadlines and 
timetables for completion of tasks. These are: (I) military issues (a) re-establishment 
of the ceasefire, (b) withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of all UNITA military 
force, (c) disarming of all civilians, (d) completion of the formation of the Angolan 
Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization. (II) the Police; (III) The United 
Nations Mandate, the role of observers of the peace accords and the Joint Commission; 
(IV) national reconciliation; (V) completion of the electoral process and other pending 
issues and (VI) Other matters.
The 64-page document of the Lusaka protocols was ratified by the United Nations in 
February. However, the implementation was held up because there was uncertainty as 
to whether the leader of UNITA supported the Accord. A Joint Commission, the body 
which comprised UNITA, MPLA and the observer countries of the USA, Portugal and 
Russia had the task of investigating the violations, but the latter continued. The nature 
and content of these violations intensified after the Congress of UNITA in Bailundo, 
February, 1995. The uncertainty with respect to the attitudes of the leader of UNITA 
. intensified after the Congress of the party when it was clear that there were major 
divisions in the ranks of UNITA on the question of war. These divisions had intensified 
during the last part of 1994 when there were rumours of the injury and death of Jonas 
Savimbi. When Savimbi resurfaced after December 31,1994 he called a Congress in an 
effort to reassert his control over the party which had splintered in three or four factions. 
At this meeting the main leaders of UNITA who had initialised the Lusaka Accord were 
dismissed. Eugenio Manuvakola, the Secretary-General of the party who had been in 
control of the last stages of the negotiations was sacked. Jorge Valentim who was the 
spokesperson to the party during the negotiations was also removed. Jonas Savimbi 
complained that his general opposed the Accord.
This position changed and only abated after the meetings between Dos Santos and 
Savimbi in Lusaka in May. After a much publicised visit to South Africa, Savimbi 
declared that he would recognise Dos Santos as President. However, the statements 
from the office of the President of South Africa declared that a position should be found 
for Savimbi in the government. This echoed the old position of the West that Savimbi 
should be made Vice President. The precedent of the alliance between Nkomo and 
Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the acceptance of a position in the government of South 
Africa by Buthelezi influenced this position.
Under the Lusaka Protocol it was agreed that UNITA would participate at all levels of 
the provincial, regional and national state apparatus. UNITA was guaranteed four 
ministries (Health, Hotel and Tourism, Commerce and Construction) six vice 
ministerial posts, three governorships (Lunda South, Uige and Cuando Cubango), vice 
governorship of Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huila, and Bengo provinces, six ambassadorial 
posts, 30 municipalities (including Huambo town), 35 vice municipalities and 75 
commune posts. UNITA would also be integrated into the police with 5,500 members 
distributed at the level of the officer corps and the rank and file.
The technical base of reconciliation exposed the effort of those who want to see a clear 
alliance between the rising accumulators in UNITA and those in the MPLA. One 
publication underlined the alliance between militarism and rampant corruption which
35
would be effected by bringing UNITA into the government without instituting 
mechanisms for accountability. The interests of the working poor are noticeably absent 
in this accord. Angolan women who were active in calling for peace were not involved 
in this pact. Neither were the church leaders who had not been compromised by 
supporting either side.
The agreement called for the deployment of over 7 000 peace-keepers from the UN who 
are to be drawn from Brazil, India, Pakistan, Rumania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Each 
country will provide a battalion. Signals will be provided by Portugal with one logistics 
company from Britain. Romania will provide a military hospital and there will be a navy 
unit from Argentina. The meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Lusaka cleared 
the way for the deployment of the peace-keepers.
PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
The technical details of peace obscured the fact that there were other elements in 
Angolan society such as church leaders and ordinary citizens who wanted peace. With 
the emphasis on silencing weapons only, there was very little on the building of 
institutions to solve the contradictions among the people. The peace efforts did not 
include education for peace or the building of democratic structures which could sustain 
peace. Angolan society has had a long history of violence and coercion and there is the 
need for building institutions which could inspire popular intervention where 
differences in the society could be dealt with on a new basis. Treatment of differences, 
the development of politically neutral terminology and the process of demilitarization 
are elements which could sustain peace. The thrust of demystifying ethnicity must be 
an important aspect of the social reconciliation in the society. "The appeal to and the 
manipulation of an ethnic identity in Africa oftentimes obscures the material interests 
of those who employ it." In the words of Archie Mafeje,
There is a real difference between the man who, on behalf of his tribe, strives to maintain its 
traditional integrity and autonomy, and the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain 
a power position, not in the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is 
to undermine and exploit supposed tribesmen. 50
The violence against the Bakongo in Luanda has raised the issue of ethnic insecurity in 
the society. Ethnic insecurity, competition and divisions developed not only out of war 
but also out of inadequate education and corrupt politics. The pursuit of ethnic security 
and the free association of all communities must be one of the foundations of peace.
The peace process requires the full participation of the Angolan peoples. This would 
include new institutions for popular participation of the working poor at the level of 
local government administration. This would rely on a policy of reconstruction based 
on education, participation and development from below to restore the confidence of 
the working people. However, the plans of the UN humanitarian appeal suggest an 
alternative path where international non governmental elements would begin to play a 
more dominant role in the Angolan society. This would ensure a repeat of the 
Mozambican experience of war, peace accords, international supervised elections and 
stagnation which reflects one path of the post colonial road. Joseph Hanlon who has 
studied the impact of foreign humanitarian organizations in Southern Africa has pointed
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out the negative impact of this work when foreigners have been brought in at high cost 
(out of budgets allocated for aid) to carry out jobs that locals can do at one-quarter the 
cost.
There are thousands of consultants in Angola who now earn their living flying in and out 
to tell the "donors’ what the local workers could have told them. What is particularly 
nefarious is the fact that many of these consultants are from the very same countries 
which supported destabilization. Using the experience of Mozambique, Hanlon said that
NGO’s were brought in to distribute food and medicines when government agencies were already 
doing a better job at lower cost. But this was overtly political USAID was carrying out official 
policy to weaken the government and to reduce its size. Thus, in Zambezia province, one NGO 
was actually paid with aid money to compete with the government health service.51
In the peace-keeping experience of Mozambique, the process involved the expenditure 
of over US $1 billion, all of which came from "donors". Most of this money went to the 
international staff and very little remained in Mozambique. At the end of the 1994 
elections, the ambassador of the United States to Mozambique expressed satisfaction 
in the exercise and called on the international community to learn the lessons of 
peace-keeping operations. Can the lessons learnt by international elements in 
Mozambique be the same lessons for the producers in the region of Southern Africa? 
This becomes a burning issue in the context of the struggle for democracy beyond elite 
politics in Africa.
The experiences of Mozambique and Angola suggest that the very same forces who 
profited from warfare are the same elements who want to profit from the peace keeping 
process. This is clearest with respect to the companies seeking contracts for the removal 
of landmines and unexploded ordinance in Angola. There is the obscene situation of 
the very companies who sold the mines bidding for the contracts to remove the mines. 
Estimates are that it cost US $3-6 to produce a landmine and it cost over US$50-100 to 
remove a landmine. Since the Secretary of State of the United States presented a report 
to Congress on "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," there has been a spate 
of international conferences on the clearance of landmines. The US Demining 
Assistance Programme provided training equipment and funds to clear landmines but 
very little of this money went to those from the societies most affected. This initiative 
has given rise to a new crop of consultants. Angola has one of the highest proportion of 
landmines and the long- term impact on the peasantry will be tremendous. The 
humanitarian appeal of the United Nations does not envisage the involvement of 
Angolans in the mine-clearing exercises. Peace in Angola and Africa requires that 
Africans participate at the international level to ban the production and use of 
landmines.
The Angolan society can avoid the extreme forms of humanitarian domination since 
Angola is rich enough to take the lead in the reconstruction of the society. Of the total 
costs associated with the implementing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan government 
will contribute about 30 per cent while the other 70 per cent will come from international 
contributions. The strengthening of the local capacity of Angolans to take the lead in 
reconstruction will depend on deeper cooperation with those societies in Southern 
Africa which have a vested interest in resisting recolonization. In Angola, this will 
require a determined struggle against those who see the future of Angola as tied to Brazil 
and Portugal instead of in a strong and integrated Southern Africa.
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CONCLUSION
This paper began with the cultural outpouring of an artist who called on politicians to 
pull their own weight. In the introduction it was also pointed out how the organic 
intellectuals of the armaments industry have regrouped into conflict resolution centres. 
Some of these centres declare that they are also institutions of peace. However, the very 
nature of the functioning of the international system requires a deeper interrogation of 
what is the meaning of peace. The Angolan peace process since 1975 raises fundamental 
questions of the efficacy of technical undertakings relating to demobilization and the 
creation of new armies based on former combatants. None of the treaties orchestrated 
since the Alvor accords of 1975 seriously questioned the intellectual and economic 
underpinnings of militarism in Africa.
The peoples of Southern Africa have suffered from the oppression initiated by 
colonialism, the military pacification campaigns and the war to destabilize the project 
of self-determination in the region. This has been most evident in Angola where the war 
for national independence was taken over by the issues of the Cold War and the ensuing 
militarization of the state and society. Displaced by the massive firepower of a capital 
intensive war, mobilised on the basis of ethnic and regional consciousness and exploited 
at every level of the social structure, the poor of Angola developed techniques of survival 
while hoping for a period of peace where they could participate in the reconstruction of 
the society.
Since the political change in South Africa in May 1994, the question of peace and 
demilitarization has been placed squarely before the peoples of the region. Peace and 
demilitarization came in the context of deep changes in the material conditions of 
production both in Africa and in the international political system. The material 
transformations have been faster than the cultural and intellectual transformations. The 
political changes in the region emanated from the confidence of the poor that they could 
fight for self-determination. African women and the youth are in the forefront of the 
challenge to conceptualize the transformation of social relations. However, for the 
international mediators, peace is simply the silencing of weapons and not the building 
of democratic structures. The arms manufacturers at Armscor continue to seek to profit 
from wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Angola and other parts of the world where there are 
explicit arms embargoes. The pressure to maintain this industry reinforces the point that 
peace in the region involves the conversion of the military industrial complex and the 
diversion of military budgets to the provision of social needs.
The elections in Mozambique in November 1994 and the engagement of the leaders of 
the Frontline states in the uprisings in Lesotho brought out the question of regional 
cooperation for peace in Southern Africa. There are elements who recognize that 
regional economic and political cooperation must be predicated on peace and social 
reconstruction. This reality propelled the leaders of SADC into the peace process in 
Angola. Throughout Southern Africa, the exploited seek new economic initiatives to 
break the marginalization of the peoples of Africa in the new world order.
Unfortunately, the question of peace has been conceptualised in terms of conciliating 
the very forces who have a vested interest in militarism and force. This is the major 
challenge in Angola. The war in Angola was one of the most protracted in Africa. The
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stages of the war stretched from the period from the decolonization period to the end 
of the Cold War. Angolan society was the arena of intense contestation because the 
stakes were so high. The social forces in Angola who want peace have been marginalized 
and silenced by the military forces and the external mediators. Angolan women who 
have suffered the most from the war have been silenced by the tremendous effort to 
impose a form of market force which removes them from the real market place. These 
women through songs and orature console their communities, developing techniques of 
survival while planning for a period of peace where they could p articip ate in the building 
of a different society. The essential but unrecognised base of the Angolan economy has 
been the unwaged work done in the household and in the community to provide health, 
education, and welfare. This work was done in the context of war daily renewing the 
energies of the society.
Feminists in Southern Africa have pointed to the need for different priorities in the 
peace and reconstruction process. Mcfadden argued that,
In Southern Africa, recent victories against settler colonialism have shown clearly that the 
contributions and sacrifices made by women (either through choice or misfortune) are quickly 
forgotten by their male ’comrades’ after the initial euphoria of independence is over. These trends 
indicate that unless we challenge male power structures and begin to restructure the relationship 
between women on the one hand and men in their use and control of institutionalised violence 
(through the military, police and an array of weaponry) on the other, we will be faced with an even 
more dire situation in the future, in terms of our very existence as human beings'52
The question of the future of Angolans as human beings and the struggles of men and 
women for a better life under conditions of peace help to bring back the issues of social 
emancipation away from the ideals of liberalization and structural adjustment. African 
scholars of every hue have pointed to the fact that there is now a definite effort to 
recolonize Africa using a new form of trusteeship system. Ali Mazrui argued for new 
forms of self-pacification by Africans since, "a more general collapse of law and order 
in some African countries is raising the spectre of recolonization and a new "trusteeship 
system." The elements of the new imperialism are real.53
The ideology of liberalism is the handmaiden of this imperialism in the post Cold War 
period. The devaluation of the return to the working people is a major component of 
this strategy. In this sense there is a new form of warfare in Africa but the weapons are 
different. One of the weapons of this war is as old as colonialism, this is the weapon of 
divide and rule. This weapon will be harnessed in the period of structural adjustment. 
The embryonic elements of capitalism in Angola do not have the base for capital 
accumulation and in the process of competition ethnic rivalry will be manipulated.
The persistence of ethnic discussions and ethnic alliances serve the interests of those 
classes which are emerging out of the war strengthened in their role as middle persons 
for international capital. Coordination for peace in the society requires a new mode of 
politics which brings to the forefront the interests of the producers of Angola. This mode 
of politics must be based on democratic institutions not only in the central administration 
but in all areas of social reproduction. This is the major task since the society will have 
to struggle to overcome the deformities of 500 years of Portuguese colonial ideas. The 
challenge is for a new leadership to link itself to the consciousness of the people. In 
former periods of crisis, African women rose to this challenge and the history of Queen 
Nzinga remains part of the powerful memory of the poor who want reconstruction for 
the working people.
39
NOTES
1. go de(Jamaican Language) term which express approval and encouragement.
2. This is the title of a conference organised by the United State Institute of Peace, 
November 30 - December 1,1994, See also Thomas Ohlson, Stephen John Stedman 
and Robert Davies, The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern 
Africa, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C, 1994.
3. William I. Zartman, "Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa." in 
Africa Conflict Resolution: The US Role. David R, Smock and 
Chester A. Crocker (eds), United States Institute for Peace,
January 1995.
4. G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, "United States Policy Towards Zaire,"
in Gerald J. Bender, James S, Coleman and Richard 1. Sklar, (eds),
African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1985, pp 255-238. See also Stephen 
Weisman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo. Cornell 
University Press, 1974.
5. See "Interim Report of the Secretary General on the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution," Addis Ababa, 1993.
6. For a full text of the ceasefire agreement and the 
various protocols, see Peace Accords for Angola, official 
translation of the State Department of the USA, Washington, May 1991.
7. Margaret Anstee, "Angola, The Forgotten Tragedy:
A Test Case for UN Peacekeeping," International Relations.
Vol 11, No. 6, December 1993.
8. Mary Kaldor, ’Warfare and Capitalism" in E.P. Thompson,.
Exterminism and War, Verso Books, 1989.
9. Patricia McFadden, "Women, War and Militarism," SAPEM, March 1991, pp 36.
10. Horace Campbell, "Angolan Women and the Electoral 
Process in Angola, 1992," African Development. Vol XVIII,
N o.2,1993, pp 23-63.
11. Wamba dia Wamba, ’Beyond Elite Politics of Democracy in Africa," 
in Quest. University of Zambia, Vol 1, No. 1, June 1992, pp 32-42.
40
12. Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity Warfare:
Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties.
Pantheon Books, New York, 1989.
13. Birgit Brock-Utne, Education For Peace. Pergamon Press,
New York, 1985.
14. Seymour Melman, The Demilitarised Society. Harvest House,
Montreal, 1988.
15. Jacques Depelchin, "War and Peace in Southern Africa
(1880-1993): Between Popular and Institutional Memories/Histories/Silences," 
Mimeo, 1993.
16. Horace Campbell. The Siege of Cuito Guanavale.
Current African Issues, 10. The Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, Uppsala, 1990.
17. John M. Mackenzi, Propaganda and Empire:
The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960,
Manchester University Press, 1985, pp.3.
18. Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The Terrorism Industry:
The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of
Terror, Pantheon Books, New York, 1990.
19. For a critical review of this book see Horace Campbell, "Psychological Warfare 
and Disinformation in Southern Africa," SAPEM. October 1980, pp. 40-45.
20. James Barber and John Barrat. South Africa’s Foreign Policy:
The Search for Status and Security, 1945-1988, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
21. Victoria Brittain, "Angolan Democracy: The International 
Betrayal." Southern African Report, January 1994, pp. 25.
22. Victoria Brittain, "When Democracy is Not Enough:
Denying Angel’s Election Result,"
Southern African Report. January-February 1993, pp. 41-45.
See also "Angolan Democracy: The International
Betrayal. Southern African Report, January 1994. This position of
Brittain is in marked contrast to the analysis of Human Rights Watch.
23. Victoria Brittain, Southern Africa Report, January 1994, pp. 24.
24. The Peace of Cuito Cuanavale: Documents of a Process.
Editoria Politica, Havana, Cuba, 1990.
25. Elaine Windrich, See section on ’Famine as Propaganda" in The Cold War 
Guerrilla, pp. 159-163.
41
26. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar,
"Can military intervention be "humanitarian"? in Middle East Report.
March - June 1994.
27. For details of the role of the coordination of the Humanitarian 
Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) of the Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs, see Situation Analysis. 1995.
28. W.G. Clarence - Smith. Slaves, peasants and capitalists in 
Southern Angola 1840 - 1926. Cambridge University.
29. Wamba Dia Wamba, "Some Aspects of the Historical 
Background to National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa:
The Case of Angola,"
30. W.G. Clarence - Smith, "The MPLA and the Peasantry,"
paper presented at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, February 1983.
31. Quotes in E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War.
Verso Books, London, 1987.
32. Amilcar Cabtal, Revolution in Guinea.pp 58.
33. Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990’s: The Potential for 
Recovery, Special Report 1079, EIU, London 1987. This report 
was updated to read Angola to 2000, Prospects for Recovery.
Economic Intelligence Unit, 1993.
34. For the official figures of diamond production see 
Rene Pelissier, "Angola, Physical and Social Geography,"
in Africa South of the Sahara. Europa Publications, London 1994.
35. See Europa Publications above, pp. 138-139 for the figures of increased oil 
production.
36. FAPLA: Baluarte de PAZ em ANGOLA, produced by the 
Agitation and Propaganda section of the National Political
Department of FAPLA, printed by Berger Levrault International, Paris, 1989, pp 51.
37. Horace Campbell, The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale.
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1990. pp. 24-26.
38. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Angola: Arms Trade V 
Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 elections, pp 30.
39. Alex Vines, "Angola: Africa’s Biggest Arms Purchaser,".
SAPEM, April 1995, pp 15.
40. W. James Martin III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990. pp 
96-97.
42
41. Figures produced by HQ UNAVEMII on "Demobilization of Troops 
as of 06 October, 1992," Luanda, Angola.
42. Ibid, pp 88.
43. Signe Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa’s 
Military Industry, Oxford University Press, London, 1989, pp 80-112.
44. Mary Kaldor, "Warfare and Capitalism," in E.P. Thompson,.
Exterminism and War, Verso Books, 1989.
45. Fernando Gonzalves, "Is France Supplying Arms to UNIT A?".
SAPEM, August 1994. pp 21.
46. Horace Campbell, The United Nations and Angola,
SAPEM. November, 1993.
47 ,"SA’ arms dealing underworld," the Weekly Mail. June 2-8,1995. pp 9.
48. Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity 
warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and
AntiTerrorism in the Eighties, Pantheon Books, New York, 1988. pp 74.
49. The details were spelt out in a press conference by 
Davidow at the Airport in Abidjan on March 28, 1993.
50. Archie Mafeje, "The Ideology of Tribalism," Journal of 
Modern African Studies. 1971, pp 136-140. See also "
De-Mystifying Tribalism: Identity, Politics and Conflict
in Modern Africa," CODESRIA Bulletin. Number 1,1995.
51. Joseph Hanlon. "Its time to say: no more." Africa Agenda.
London, Vol. 1 No.2.1995 pp 9. The theme of the destabilising role of external 
aid workers is elaborated in his book, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? 
Heinemann, London, 1992.
52. Patricia McFadden, "Women, War and Militarism, op cit, pp. 35.
53. Ali A.Mazrui, "Africa in Search of Self Pacification,",
Africa Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 370, January 1994.
/
43
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
h ttp : / /o p e n d o c s .id s .a c .u k /o p e n d o c s /
Institute o f 
Development Studies
